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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 3 and Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j)(2009). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Plaintiff s Complaint sought Declaratory Relief with respect to the parties' 
rights and obligations regarding Defendants' property. The Trial Court fashioned an equitable 
remedy by granting a Declaratory Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, entitling Plaintiff to live in 
Defendants' studio apartment rent-free for the remainder of his life, subject to the condition that 
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Defendants' studio apartment rent-free for the remainder of his life, subject to the condition that 
he maintain the property in good appearance and repair. R. 96-103, 112-120, 121-124 
(Findings & Conclusions, Conclusion No. 1; Order). Plaintiff does not challenge the Trial Court's 
Findings & Conclusions or Order regarding this Declaratory Judgment, except to request 
additional findings and conclusions clarifying at minimum (1) the scope and nature of the future 
work required of Plaintiff to maintain his right to live on the Property; and (2) whether the Utah 
Fit Premises Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-22-1 to -7) applies. Plaintiff seeks an order remanding 
these issues for their final disposition by the Trial Court. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review requesting remand for the Trial Court's 
additional consideration of these Declaratory Judgment issues would be an "abuse of discretion" 
standard. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-404 (district court has discretion to refuse to render or 
enter a declaratory judgment or decree where it would not terminate the uncertainty or 
controversy giving rise to the proceedings); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-405 (decrees under this 
part may be reviewed in same manner as other decrees); Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 
866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993) ("If the action is ripe, we review the trial court's decision to 
either grant or deny declaratory relief under section 78-33-6 [section renumbered later to 
§78B-6-404] for an abuse of discretion). As to whether or not the Trial Court should issue 
additional findings and conclusions to properly fashion its equitable relief, see, e.g., Ockey v. 
Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, \ 42, 189 P.3d 51 (availability of a remedy is a legal conclusion reviewed 
for correctness, but "atrial court is accorded considerable latitude and discretion in applying and 
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formulating an equitable remedy, and [it] will not be overturned unless it [has] abused its 
discretion.") (citation omitted). In re Estate ofLeFevre, 2009 UT App 286, ^ 10, 220 P.3d 476, 
cert, denied, 230 P.3d 127 (Utah 2010); OLP, LLC v. Burningham, 2008 UT App 173, ^ f 11, 185 
P.3d 1138, aff d 2009 UT 75, 225 P.3d 177 (Use of equitable remedies reviewed under an abuse 
of discretion standard."). 
Preservation of Issue: Plaintiff raised these Declaratory Judgment issues in his 
Complaint (R: 1-5, First Cause of Action); at trial (R: 330, pp. 275-276, 278, 301-302, 319); in 
his Motion to Enter the Attached Order (R. 125-127); his subsequent Motion to Amend 
Judgment or Set Aside Judgment with supporting Memorandum in Support of Rule 59 and/or 
Rule 60 Motion (R. 146-151); and in his Notice of Appeal (R. 157-159). 
ISSUE 2: There is insufficient support for the Trial Court's legal conclusion that 
Defendants were not unjustly enriched by Plaintiffs "heavy equipment" work because the trial 
court did not correctly address or apply the case law regarding unjust enrichment and other legal 
standards with respect to the evidence presented by the parties. 
Standard of Review: A claim based on an equitable doctrine such as unjust enrichment 
is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard, but the legal sufficiency of those findings, as well as the legal conclusions 
based on those findings, are reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. See, e.g., Selvig v. 
Blockbuster Enterprises, LC, 2011 UT 39, ^19; Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B &L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 
83,1f 9, 12, 12 P.3d 580. Because of the fact-intensive nature of equitable doctrines, a trial court 
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reviewing a claim of unjust enrichment is granted "broader discretion" in applying the law to the 
facts. See Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, U 11, 222 P.3d 69; Alpha Partners, Inc. v. 
Transamerica Inv. Mgmt, LLC, 2006 UT App 33 H 16. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised and preserved below in Plaintiffs argument 
and closing argument at trial (R. 330 pg 221-223, 303-308, 316, 318-319) his Supplemental Trial 
Authority (R. 108-111), and his Notice of Appeal (R. 157-159). (However, an argument 
regarding insufficiency of evidence need not be specifically preserved by objection below, see 
State v. LA., 2010 UT App 356, <[| 10 n.3, 245 P.3d 213; Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 14 Solutions, 
Inc., 2010 UT App 9, ^ 11, 223 P.3d 1141(M A trial court judge has the opportunity to address the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings in his or her judgment." (quoting In re K.F., 
2009 UT 4, \ 62, 201 P.3d 985)) 
ISSUE 3: Under applicable "contract" law and "unjust enrichment" law, the Trial 
Court's factual Findings are insufficient to support its Conclusion that Defendants are entitled to 
retain the 50% interest in Plaintiffs Backhoe. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusions of law with respect to contract issues in 
civil cases are reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation 
Co., 2011 UT 33, ^ 19, 258 P.3d 539 (Interpretation of a contract is a question of law, reviewed 
for correctness); Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ^ 25, 190 P.3d 1269 (Determination of whether 
a contract is facially ambiguous is a question of law reviewed for correctness). 
4 
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A claim based on an equitable doctrine such as unjust enrichment is a mixed question of 
law and fact. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, 
but the legal sufficiency of those findings, as well as the legal conclusions based on those 
findings, are reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. See, e.g., Selvig v. Blockbuster 
Enterprises, LC, 2011 UT 39, If 19; Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, If 9, 12, 
12 P.3d 580. Because of the fact-intensive nature of equitable doctrines, a trial court reviewing a 
claim of unjust enrichment is granted "broader discretion" in applying the law to the facts. See 
Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, If 11, 222 P.3d 69; Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica 
Inv. Mgmt, LLC, 2006 UT App 331 fl 16. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised and preserved below in Plaintiffs 
argument and closing argument at trial (R. 330 pg 222-225, 303-308, 316, 318-319) his 
Supplemental Trial Authority (R. 108-111), and his Notice of Appeal (R. 157-159). (Though 
an argument regarding insufficiency of evidence need not be specifically preserved by objection 
below, see State v. L.A., 2010 UT App 356, ^ 10 n.3, 245 P.3d 213; Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 
14 Solutions, Inc., 2010 UT App 9, If 11, 223 P.3d 1141("A trial court judge has the opportunity 
to address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings in his or her judgment." 
(quoting In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, \ 62, 201 P.3d 985)), 
ISSUE 4: The Trial Court abused its discretion by refusing to consider Plaintiffs May 
9, 2011, Motion pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (finding that Plaintiff failed 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 to identify any grounds for relief or state with 
5 
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particularity the relief sought), because Plaintiff did identify grounds and state the relief sought in 
a manner sufficient to fulfill the requirements of Utah law under Rule 60(b). 
Standard of Review: A Trial Court's denial of a motion to set aside a judgment under 
Rule 60(b) is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. Golden Meadows Props, LC v. 
Strand, 2010 UT App 258, U 3, 241 P.3d 371. See also Kendal! Ins., Inc. v. R&R Group, Inc., 
2008 UT App. 235, K 11, 189 P.3d 114 (quoting Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., v. Melvin, 
2000 UT App 110,19, 2 P.3d 114). On appeal from a Rule 60(b) order, the reviewing court 
addresses only the propriety of the denial of relief and does not reach the merits of the 
underlying argument. See id. Further, a trial court's interpretation of the rules of civil procedure 
presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. In re Estate ofLeFevre, 2009 UT 
App 286, H 14, 220 P.3d 476 (citing Nvnley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, \ 42, 
989 P.2d 1077). 
Preservation of Issue: Plaintiff raised and preserved these issues for appeal in his 
Motion to Enter the Attached Order dtd 4/22/2011 (R: 125-127).; his Motion to Amend 
Judgment or Set Aside Judgment, with supporting Memorandum in Support of Rule 59 and/or 
Rule 60 Motion, entered 5/9/2011 (R: 146-151); and in his Notice of Appeal filed 5/17/2011 (R: 
157-159). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-401 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-404 
6 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-405 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-406 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-412 
UtahR. Civ. Proc. 7(b)(1) 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 8(c)(superceded 2011) 
UtahR. Civ. Proc. 60(b) 
Utah Fit Premises Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-22-1 to -7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The following statement regarding the "nature of the case" is presented most favorably 
towards the Appellee, taking into account the Court's findings. Defendants Kenneth E. Hart and 
Clara Watts Hart, by and through the Kenneth E. & Clara Watts Hart Family Living Trust 
("Defendants") owned real property in Kanosh, Utah, consisting of 1.54 acres with a shop building 
and small studio apartment. (R. 112-120, pp. 1-2; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
April 21, 2011, Exhibit "E" (hereinafter "Findings & Conclusions"), Finding No. 1) In or about 
2006, Defendants Kenneth Hart and Clara Hart orally agreed with Plaintiff Elmer Bowen 
("Plaintiff), who was then approximately 89 years of age, that he could live in the studio 
apartment on the property in exchange for maintaining the yard, making the house livable and 
reporting trespassers. (R: 330, pp. 11, 44-47) 
7 
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From 2006 until sometime in 2008, Plaintiff spent time cleaning, maintaining and repairing 
Defendants5 Property, including painting the building, floors and walls of the shop and studio 
apartment; making a garden and an orchard; mowing weeds; pruning trees, and watering (R. 330, 
pp. 52-56, 68, 72). The parties agreed that this work would be in exchange for the use of the 
studio property. (Id. at 11, 44-47) 
In October 2006, nearly a year after Plaintiff had moved to the property in question, 
Plaintiff purchased approximately $21,689 in heavy equipment, including a backhoe for $15,300. 
(R: 112-120, p.3; Findings & Conclusions, Finding No. 1 l.a) Plaintiff intended to use this 
equipment to earn money. (R: 330, pp. 73, 117-118) In response to the Defendants' request, 
Plaintiff used his heavy equipment to work on Defendants' Property; he graded the Property, 
brought in fill, built fences, removed dilapidated structures and concrete pads, and planted trees. 
(R: 330, pp. 112-115, 120-123, 125-129, 131-137, 159-162). Plaintiffs heavy equipment work 
consisted of approximately 500 to 580 hours during this two-year period (R: 330, p. 309; R: 
112-120, p. 3, Findings, Finding No. 11(b)). Plaintiff understood that the heavy equipment 
work he performed constituted separate and independent work, outside of the parties' verbal 
agreement for free rent, for which he was entitled to monetary compensation (R: 112-120, p. 
2-3: Findings & Conclusions, Finding No. 8), but Defendants understood that all Plaintiffs 
heavy equipment work was included in their agreement for cleaning up and maintaining the 
property in exchange for free rent or was done as one friend for another. (Id at Finding No. 9) 
8 
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In 2008, Plaintiff asked the Social Security administration to reduce his Social Security 
income by 10%, because he thought he would be earning money through heavy equipment work, 
and Social Security accordingly did so. (R: 330 p. 117-118). 
On or about January 2007 (R: 330 P. 255) Plaintiff executed an undated Bill of Sale 
deeding a 50% interest in his backhoe to Kenneth Hart, and a 50% interest to Plaintiffs son. 
(Bill of Sale, Addendum Exhibit A.). Kenneth Hart testified he paid $10 to Plaintiff for this 
50% interest at the bank after the Bill of Sale was notarized (R: 330, p. 267) (though Plaintiff 
testified nothing was paid) (R: 330: p. 300 ). There was no separate writing regarding any 
additional compensation regarding the backhoe (R: 112-120, p.6, Findings & Conclusion, 
Finding No. 18) and Plaintiff did not file a lien on the backhoe in anticipation of payment. (Id. at 
Finding No. 19). The Court never expressed how the Plaintiff was to put a lien on the backhoe 
since the state does not title backhoes. 
In or about September 2008, Plaintiff verbally refused to perform further work on the 
Property until he was paid for his heavy equipment work and for the backhoe (R: 330 pp. 141, 
179, 316), but Plaintiff did not submit a bill or statement of services to Defendants for his work. 
(Id at 314). In 2008, Plaintiff requested Defendants return the backhoe to him. After the 
Defendant refused, the Plaintiff then hired legal counsel to pursue return of his backhoe and 
monetary compensation for his heavy equipment work. 
9 
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In or about December 2009, Defendants filed a Complaint to evict Plaintiff from the 
Property (R: 1-5; and R. 330 pp. 207, 285), which eviction was challenged by Plaintiffs attorney; 
however this eviction was never pursued (R: 330, pp. 204, 207, 209, 227, and Trial Exhibit 22) 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants in the Fourth District Court in and for 
Millard County on January 7, 2010, seeking declaratory relief and causes of action for breach of 
contract and/or unjust enrichment. R. 1-5. The Defendants answered Plaintiffs Complaint on 
January 11, 2010. R. 6-11. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on June 4, 2010, seeking 
recovery from Defendants based on contract, unjust enrichment and negligence causes of action, 
R. 30-37, and Defendants answered the Amended Complaint on September 24, 2010. R. 45-50. 
A Bench Trial was held before Judge Brady on February 7, 2011. R. 85-86. Plaintiff filed 
Supplemental Trial Authority on March 2, 2011, R. 108-111; a motion to amend Judgment; R. 
146; and Motion to Reconsider, R. 226-228 (which was denied on November 4, 2011. R. 
282-285). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
On or about April 21, 2011, the Trial Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, R. 112-120, and its Order, R. 121-124, as follows: 
First, the Trial Court granted a Declaratory Judgment in favor of Plaintiff, entitling 
Plaintiff to live in the studio apartment rent-free for the remainder of his life, subject to the 
condition that he maintained the property in good appearance and repair. Plaintiff seeks 
10 
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remand to the Trial Court for further findings and conclusions regarding this Declaratory 
Judgment, to determine what Elmer Bowen is obligated to do to continue living on the property 
rent free and whether the Utah Fit Premises Act applies to this agreement. 
Second, the Trial Court denied Plaintiffs claim for the return of the backhoe finding that 
the Plaintiff transferred the backhoe to the Defendant pursuant to the terms of the bill of sale. 
Plaintiff seeks reversal on this issue. 
Third, the Trial Court denied Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim for recovery of the value 
of his work regarding his heavy equipment work. The Court denied this claim finding that this 
work was done in exchange for free rent or voluntarily performing the services as a friend. The 
Court also found that Plaintiff waived his right to claim unjust enrichment in that he failed to 
submit a bill. The Court also found that Plaintiff had not provided evidence of the value by 
which his labors benefitted the Defendants. Plaintiff seeks reversal of this holding. 
On April 22, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Enter the Attached Order, based on 
Defendants' failure to comply with Rule 7(f)(2) by failing to submit a proposed order as ordered 
by the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated February 16, 2011. R. 125-127. Plaintiffs 
Attached Order clarified the Trial Court's Declaratory Judgment, including a proposed finding 
that "nothing in the Court's order is intended to effect [sic] the landlord/tenant obligations found 
in Utah Fit Premise Act." On May 2, Defendant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion to Enter the Attached Order. R. 143-145. The Court denied Plaintiffs Motion to 
enter the attached order by a minute entry ruling on May 10, 2011. R. 152-156. 
11 
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On May 9, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Judgment or Set Aside Judgment and 
Memorandum in Support of Rule 59 and/or Rule 60 Motion. R. 146. 
On May 17, 2011 Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal. R. 157-159. 
On May 27, 2011, Defendant Filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion to 
Amend Judgment or Set Aside Judgment, R. 160-199, and Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum on 
June 10, 2011. R. 204-214. Oral argument was scheduled for August 29, 2011. On July 27,2011 
the court denied Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment or Set Aside Judgment, finding that the 
Court did not have jurisdiction because Plaintiff had filed an appeal. R. 221-225. On August 15, 
2011, the Court cancelled oral argument on its own motion. R. 221-225. 
On August 29, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Rule 60 motion to reconsider the Trial Court's July 
27, 2011 ruling that it did not have jurisdiction. R. 226-228. Defendant filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition thereto September 16. 2011, R. 230-261, and Plaintiff replied on October 13, 2011. R. 
262-266. On October 20, 2011. Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff s Reply and 
Memorandum in Support, R. 269-271; on October 31, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Strike and Countermotion, R. 277-281. On November 4, 2011, the Trial 
Court issued its final order by Memorandum Decision, denying Plaintiff s May 9, 2011 Motion to 
Amend, R. 282-285. 
On November 14, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion to Withdraw Defendants' Motion to 
Strike Plaintiff s Reply in Support of Motion to Reconsider Pursuant to Rule 60, with Affidavit in 
Support. R. 286-288. 
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On December 30, 20] 1, Defendants filed a Motion for Writ of Replevin, with 
Memorandum in Support and Affidavit of Kenneth Hart. R. 298-300, 301-325. On January 9, 
2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Defendants' Memorandum Re Writ of Replevin. R. 
331-334. 
On January 10, 2012, the Trial Court entered a Final Order denying Plaintiffs Rule 59 
Motion ufor the reasons as stated in the Court's November 3, 2011 Memorandum Decision." R. 
335-336. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Defendants Kenneth and Clara Hart (through Defendant the Kenneth E. & Clara Watts 
Hart Family Living Tmst) own real property located at 345 N. 100 W., Kanosh, Utah, 
consisting of approximately 1.54 acres with a shop building of approximately 2,000 
square feet, and an attached studio apartment (the "Property"). (R. 112-120, p. 1-2. 
"Findings & Conclusions", Finding No. 1.) 
2. Plaintiff Elmer Bowen and Defendants Kenneth E. Hart and Clara Watts Hart were 
neighbors and friends residing in Cedar City, Utah. (R: 330, pp. 39-40, 230) 
3. In or about fall 2005, Plaintiff, who was then approximately 89 years old, was in the 
process of selling his home in Cedar City and was planning to move elsewhere. (R: 330, 
pp. 43-44, 232) 
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4. Defendants offered to allow Plaintiff to live in the studio apartment on the Property during 
the winter of 2005-2006 in exchange for doing basic yard work and reporting trespassers. 
(R: 330 pp. 43-44,232-233) 
5. In reliance on Defendants5 offer, Plaintiff moved to the Property. Id. 
6. For their own use, Defendants had improved the studio apartment in summer 2005 to 
make it livable, bringing in running water, a water heater, and a stove. Id. 
7. The Property was in terrible shape when Plaintiff moved in, and Plaintiff immediately 
began working to make the Property truly livable, including cleaning, painting and 
repairing large holes and cracks to keep the wind out, and to keep out numerous 
cockroaches and mice; this included hiring heavy equipment to bring in fill dirt to stop up a 
gaping hole under the apartment. {Id. at pgs. 52-56) 
8. The Trial Court found that the parties orally agreed that Plaintiff is entitled to live in the 
studio apartment on the Kanosh Property, rent-free, and that his entitlement shall 
continue for the rest of Plaintiff s life. (R.l 12-120, p.2; Findings & Conclusions, 
Finding No. 2) 
9. The only condition to the Plaintiffs right to live in the studio apartment is that he shall 
clean up, repair and maintain the property. Those terms are not better defined. (Id. at 
Finding No. 3; R: 330, pp. 11, 44-47). 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10. There is no written agreement specifying the nature and extent of the work to be provided 
by Plaintiff in exchange for the right to occupy the premises rent-free for life. (Id. at 
Finding No. 6). 
11. Instead, there was a verbal agreement to allow the Plaintiff to live rent free on the Property 
in exchange for cleaning, repairing and maintaining the Property, but the parties disagree 
as to the nature and amount of work those terms included. (Id. at Finding No. 7). 
12. The Plaintiff understood the agreement to be as when he first moved there: the parties' 
agreement allowed for the Plaintiff to live on the Property, rent free, in exchange for his 
cleaning up and maintaining the Property, such as removing weeds, planting a garden, 
removing vermin and rodents, painting and general clean-up. Since the heavy equipment 
was purchased the year following the initial agreement, Plaintiff understood that any heavy 
equipment work he performed constituted separate and independent work, outside of the 
parties5 verbal agreement for free rent. Consequently, the Plaintiff felt he was entitled to 
monetary compensation. (Id. at Finding No. 8). 
13. The Plaintiff provided expert testimony regarding the value of the following: 
1. Yard Work: $ 150/week ($600/month)( from March or May through September or 
October of each year). (R: 330, p.91-92, 99-101) 
2. For the studio apartment: $200/month. (R: 330, p. 177-178) (In contrast, 
Defendants provided expert testimony that the value of the rental would be 
$700/month if all of the acreage was included) (R: 330, p. 26) 
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3. For heavy equipment operator: $80/hour during operation; $35/hour during 
standby (R: 330, p.82-84) 
14. Defendant Kenneth Hart, and family members of the Plaintiff and Defendants, also 
contributed labor to clean and improve the property. (R: 112-120, Finding No. 5). 
15. On or about October 2006, Plaintiff purchased certain ctheavy equipment," consisting of a 
Case 580C backhoe for $15,300, a dump trailer for $5,200, and forks for the backhoe for 
$1,180. (Mat Finding No. 11.a). 
16. Plaintiff spent approximately 500 and 580 additional hours (over and above work around 
the residence) from 2006 until sometime in 2008 working using his heavy equipment 
removing buildings and doing clean-up work on other aspects of the Defendant's property. 
(R: 330, pp. 147-148; R: 112-120, Finding No. l ib ) . 
17. Plaintiff testified he purchased the heavy equipment for the purposes of making additional 
income. (R: 330, pp. 78, 117-118). 
18. Defendant Kenneth Hart drove Plaintiff to where Plaintiff purchased the heavy equipment 
and accompanied him throughout the transactions. (R: 330, pp. 74-79). 
19. Plaintiff purchased the backhoe in October 2006. (R: 330, pp. 76-77, 279) 
20. From approximately October 2006 until September 2008, Plaintiff used his heavy 
equipment to help grade the Property, bring in fill dirt, build fences, remove offending 
structures and concrete pads, and plant about a dozen and a half trees for Defendants. The 
Trial Court found that Plaintiff worked for approximately 500 to 580 hours performing 
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heavy equipment work during an approximate two-year period. (R. 330, pp. 13-16, 
125-129, 131, 134-137; R. 112-120, Finding No. l i b ) . 
21. The Defendants acknowledged that the Plaintiff s heavy equipment work was professional 
and met appropriate standards. (R: 330, p. 259) 
22. Each party supported their understanding of the terms of the agreement by the decisions 
made and actions taken by each party subsequent to the agreement. ( R. 112-120, Finding 
No. 10) 
23. Plaintiff executed a Bill of Sale identifying Defendant Kenneth Hart and Plaintiffs son 
Robert L. Kipler as the new owners of the Case 580C backhoe. This Bill of Sale is 
without date. (R: 112-120, Finding No. 13; see Bill of Sale, Exhibit "A"). 
24. The Bill of Sale was likely executed on or about January 2007, about two to four months 
after Plaintiff purchased the backhoe. (R. 330 p. 255) 
25. Plaintiff executed transfers of title of many other vehicles from himself to his son on or 
about the same day as he executed the Bill of Sale. (R. 330 pages 264-265; and R. 
112-120, Finding No. 14) 
26. The Bill of Sale indicates, in part, "in consideration of valuable consideration Dollars 
($10.00) and other valuable consideration, paid to me by Kenneth Hart and Robert L. 
Kipler, I, Elmer F. Bowen, do hereby sell and convey to the buyer them following vehicle." 
(Italicized words are those in handwriting). (R: 112-120, Finding No. 16; see also Bill of 
Sale, Exhibit A) 
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27. Defendant Kenneth Hart testified, and the Trial Court found, that Mr. Hart paid $10.00 to 
Plaintiff while both were in the bank after the Bill of Sale had been notarized. (R: 
112-120, Finding No. 17). 
28. Plaintiff testified at trial that Mr. Hart did not pay Plaintiff anything with respect to the Bill 
of Sale. (R: 330, p.300). 
29. Plaintiff did not file a lien on the backhoe to protect an anticipated payment of any money 
from the Defendants, although there was no testimony regarding how Plaintiff could have 
obtained a lien on untitled personal property. (Id. at Finding No. 19) 
30. The Plaintiff delivered the Bill of Sale and the equipment to Defendant Kenneth Hart after 
the Bill of Sale was signed.. (Id. at Finding No. 20) 
31. In 2008, Plaintiff refused to perform further work on the Property until he was paid, though 
Plaintiff did not submit a bill or statement of services to Defendants for his work. (R: 330, 
p. 141-142,316). 
32. On or about 2008, Plaintiff requested Defendants return the backhoe to him. (R: 330, p. 
280). 
33. In 2009, Plaintiff hired legal counsel to pursue return of his backhoe and monetary 
compensation for his heavy equipment work. (R. 1-5). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1: The Trial Court granted a Declaratory Judgment in favor of Plaintiff entitling him to 
live in Defendants' studio apartment rent-free for the remainder of his life "subject to the 
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condition that he maintains the Property in good appearance and repair," and decreed that "The 
Plaintiffs work of cleaning up and maintaining the Property is consideration for receiving free 
rent for the rest of his life." (R. 112-120; Findings & Conclusions, Conclusions 1-2). But 
because the parties' lawsuit was over the nature of the work required of the Plaintiff to "clean up, 
repair and maintain the Property" pursuant to their verbal rental agreement, the Declaratory 
Judgment does not give the parties sufficient guidance regarding their rights and duties. 
Therefore, to provide both parties relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to their 
rights, status and legal relations, the Trial Court should issue additional findings and conclusions 
respecting its Declaratory Judgment and decree, clarifying at minimum (1) the scope and nature 
of the future work required of Plaintiff to maintain his right to live on the Property; and (2) 
whether the Utah Fit Premises Act applies. Also, since Plaintiff only asks clarification 
concerning issues not addressed by the Trial Court, this will not tread on the Trial Court's 
authority to grant equitable relief through its Declaratory Judgment. Plaintiff thus requests an 
order remanding these issues for their final disposition by the Trial Court. 
ISSUE 2: There is insufficient support for the Trial Court's legal conclusion that Defendants 
were not unjustly enriched by Plaintiffs "heavy equipment" work, because if the correct legal 
standards are applied, then the evidence presented and the Trial Court's own findings show that 
Defendants were unjustly enriched and it would be inequitable to allow the Defendants to benefit 
by all of Plaintiff s heavy equipment work without compensating him. 
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ISSUE 3: The Trial Court's factual Findings are insufficient to support its Conclusion that 
Defendants are entitled to retain the 50% interest in the backhoe given to them by Plaintiff. Here, 
the first "fatal flaw'' is that the Trial Court did not identify, regarding the backhoe, the terms and 
conditions of the parties' agreement. This factual determination is essential in determining 
whether or not the parties had formed an enforceable contract and if so whether the Defendants 
complied with the agreement. Here, under Plaintiff s "Breach of Contract" claim, Defendants did 
not have the right to retain the backhoe because they failed to pay "valuable consideration" for the 
backhoe, as the bill of sale indicated. The second flaw is the remedy that should flow if the parties 
did not come to a "meeting of the mind" regarding the exchange. If there was no agreement as to 
the consideration, there was no contract, and under the applicable law regarding unjust 
enrichment, the backhoe should be returned based upon Plaintiffs "Breach of Contract" or 
"Unjust Enrichment" claims. 
ISSUE 4: The Trial Court abused its discretion by refusing to consider Plaintiff s May 9, 2011, 
Motion pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Trial Court denied this Motion for 
the stated reason that the Plaintiff failed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 to identify any 
grounds for relief or state with particularity the relief sought. However, Plaintiff s Motion 
explicitly identified his grounds for relief in accordance with the requirements of Rule 60(b) under 
Utah law, and Plaintiff also clearly stated with particularity the relief he sought, i.e., the 
opportunity to submit additional evidence or oral argument to address two important questions that 
had not been addressed in the Trial Court's Findings and Order. 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE 1: THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD ENTER ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS TO ESTABLISH CLEAR DIRECTIVES IN ITS DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT AND AFFORD THE PARTIES RELIEF FROM UNCERTAINTY 
In this matter, the Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment defining the Plaintiffs rights, 
obligations and protections in the use of the Defendants' property (R: 1-5, Complaint), and at trial 
the parties agreed to the entry of such a judgment. (R: 330, p. 301). The Trial Court thereafter 
issued a Declaratory Judgment as follows: 
Declaratory Judgment is granted in favor of the Plaintiff, wherein the Plaintiff shall be 
entitled to live in the studio apartment on the property located at 345 North 100 West, 
Kanosh, Utah (hereinafter "Property") for the remainder of the Plaintiffs life, rent free, 
subject to the condition that he maintains the Property in good appearance and repair. 
(R: 121-124, p. 1-2, Order, If h Exhibit "F"; see also R: 112-120, p. 6, Findings & 
Conclusions, Conclusion 1, Exhibit "E") 
Plaintiff does not challenge herein the Trial Court's Findings & Conclusions, as far as it 
goes, regarding the Declaratory Judgment aspects of its Order, except for its failure to identify 
more precisely what Plaintiff is required to do in the future in order to continue living in the studio 
apartment rent-free and whether the Utah Fit Premises Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-22-1 to -7) 
applies. To address these concerns, after the Trial Court entered its Findings & Conclusions, 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Enter the Attached Order (R. 125-127) and his subsequent Motion to 
Amend Judgment or Set Aside Judgment with supporting Memorandum pursuant to Rule 59 
and/or Rule 60 Motions (R. 146-151, at 149-150). 
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These Motions sought relief from continued uncertainty regarding their rights and 
obligations under the Declaratory Judgment. Plaintiff requested that the Trial Court enter 
additional findings and conclusions respecting its Declaratory Judgment regarding the terms and 
conditions of the parties' oral rental agreement. Plaintiff therefore requests an order from this 
Court remanding such issues for their final disposition by the Trial Court 
A district court may issue declaratory judgments determining rights, status, and other 
legal relations; a declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and it has 
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-401. In this case, the 
Trial Court granted a Declaratory Judgment in favor of Plaintiff entitling him to live in 
Defendants' studio apartment rent-free for the remainder of his life "subject to the condition that 
he maintains the Property in good appearance and repair." (R: 121-124, p. 1-2, Order, ^ 1; R: 
112-120, p. 6, Findings & Conclusions, Conclusion 1) The Trial Court further decreed that "the 
Plaintiffs work of cleaning up and maintaining the Property is consideration for receiving free 
rent for the rest of his life." (Id. at Conclusion 2). Although the parties' dispute at trial was 
entirely over the nature of the work required of the Plaintiff to "clean up, repair and maintain the 
Property" pursuant to the parties' verbal agreement, the Trial Court gave the parties no other 
guidance regarding their rights and duties in its Declaratory Judgment - even though the Court 
itself noted in its Findings that "Those terms are not better defined" (Id. at Finding No. 3). 
Plaintiff sought declaratory relief to "better define" the relationship, which the Court's ruling did 
not accomplish. In particular, despite Plaintiffs requests, neither the Trial Court's Declaratory 
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Judgment nor any of its other findings and conclusions specified (1) exactly the scope and nature 
of the future work required of Plaintiff to continue his right to live on the Property; and (2) 
whether the Utah Fit Premises Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-22-1 to -7) applies to the parties' oral 
rental agreement. Resolution of these facts and issues by the Trial Court would afford both 
parties relief from a great deal of uncertainty and insecurity with respect to their rights, status 
and legal relations. The very purpose of Utah's statute providing for declaratory judgments is "to 
settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other 
legal relations," and the statute is to be liberally construed and administered. Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-6-412. 
In this case, if either party wished to enforce the Trial Court's Declaratory Judgment or 
decree based on a belief that the other party had failed to comply with its terms, that party would 
be hard pressed to explain the basis relief which should be granted. The Court's ruling does not 
satisfy the fundamental basis for a declaratory judgment. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-406 states 
"relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. 
. . . If the application is considered sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any 
adverse party, whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to 
show cause why further relief should not be immediately granted." However, neither a motion 
to enforce, nor injunctive relief, can be used to address matters beyond the scope of the 
underlying judgment sought to be enforced. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court: 
23 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
When a motion to enforce is based on a court order, the order must contain an 
"unequivocal mandate" directing the respondent to undertake some action." An 
unequivocal mandate or clear directive is necessary because "[a] court's power to 
enforce a judgment is confined to the four corners of the judgment itself" And 
without a directive or unequivocal mandate, there is nothing for the court to enforce 
against the respondent party. In addition, a clear directive is necessary because a 
motion to enforce "cannot be used to take up matters beyond the contours of the 
judgment and thereby short-circuit the usual adjudicative processes. 
Berman v. Yarborough, 2011 UT 79,1J15 267 P.3d 905; see also id at ^ 22: "[A]s 
discussed above, for the enforcement of a declaratory judgment to be proper, the underlying 
judgment must contain an unequivocal mandate or clear directive for a party to undertake a 
certain action." Here, the Declaratory Judgment, without more, simply puts the parties back to 
square one: bitterly arguing Plaintiffs rights and obligations regarding cleaning up and repairing 
the Property and Defendants' obligation to make the property habitable. For example, if 
Plaintiff refuses to perform any more yard work required to keep the property in good 
appearance and repair, would that be considered a breach of the parties' oral agreement? If 
Defendants refused to replace a broken pipe flooding the bathroom, would Plaintiff have a cause 
of action under the Utah Fit Premises Act because his rental unit had become uninhabitable due 
to violations of health and safety standards — or, does the Act not apply here and instead would 
Defendants actually have a cause of action against Plaintiff because of the broken pipe, based on 
his failure to "clean up and maintain" the Property and keep it "in good appearance and repair"? 
It is critical here for the Trial Court to issue additional findings and conclusions so that the 
parties will have clear directives regarding their rights and responsibilities under their oral rental 
agreement. Again, regardless of how the Trial Court ultimately decides these issues, and 
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whatever additional findings and conclusions it decides to fashion, any decision will help 
terminate the remaining uncertainty and controversy in this case. 
Next, the Trial Court's declaratory relief decision has significant impact on analyzing 
Plaintiffs unjust enrichment and breach of contract claims. The Court's refusal to enter at least 
some minimal additional findings and conclusions to guide the parties here constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. Section 78B-6-404 particularly provides that a court may refuse to render or enter a 
declaratory judgment or decree "where a judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not 
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-6-404. See, e.g., Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT12, ^ 26, 66P.3d592 (declaratory judgment 
improper because decree would not terminate uncertainty or controversy between parties); Boyle 
v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993)(If trial court determines 
declaratory judgment would not terminate uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the 
proceeding, then court may decline to grant); Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish 
Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 882 (Utah 1996): (under Utah Declaratory Judgment Act trial court has 
discretion to either grant or deny declaratory judgment action if it would not terminate uncertainty 
or controversy). 
Finally, an order for remand to the Trial Court regarding these issues will not tread on the 
Trial Court's broad authority to grant equitable relief through its Declaratory Judgment. Plaintiff 
acknowledges that this Court will review use of equitable remedies fashioned by the Trial Court 
under an abuse of discretion standard and that "[t]his standard recognizes 'the district court's 
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[unique] ability to balance facts and craft equitable remedies and our [corresponding] hesitance 
to act as a Monday morning quarterback in such matters.,,, Collardv. Nagle Constr., Inc., 2006 
UT 72, ^ 13, 149 P.3d 348 (alterations in original) (quoting Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, \ 
23, 112 P.3d 495). See also Myrah v. Campbell, 2007 UT App 168, ^  25, 163 P.3d 679 ("Utah 
courts 'have broad authority to grant equitable relief as needed.'") (Citations omitted). But here, 
Plaintiff is only asking this Court to remand issues simply not addressed by the Trial Court for 
ultimate resolution by the Trial Court itself. Accordingly, the Trial Court's broad equitable 
discretion to fashion a remedy will remain respected here even upon remand. 
In conclusion, to afford both parties relief from continuing uncertainty and insecurity 
with respect to their rights, status and legal relations, the Trial Court should issue additional 
findings and conclusions respecting its Declaratory Judgment and decree, clarifying at minimum 
(1) the scope and nature of the future work required of Plaintiff to maintain his right to live on 
the Property; and (2) whether the Utah Fit Premises Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-22-1 to -7) 
applies to the parties' oral rental agreement. Plaintiff therefore requests an order from this 
Court remanding these issues for their final disposition by the Trial Court. 
ISSUE 2: THERE IS INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S 
LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANTS WERE NOT 
UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY PLAINTIFF'S "HEAVY EQUIPMENT" 
WORK BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY 
APPLY THE APPLICABLE LAW 
L Marshalling Requirement: Evidence Supporting Trial Court's Conclusions 
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Except as otherwise indicated herein, Plaintiff basically challenges the Trial Court's legal 
conclusion ultimately dismissing Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim with respect to his heavy 
equipment work. However, Plaintiff will first marshal the evidence. See Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 
2011 UT App 161 ("Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, ... if a 
determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely 
fact-sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the evidence. "Xciting Chen v. Stewart, 
2004 UT 82, If 20, 100 P.3d 1177). 
First, the Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions with respect to Plaintiffs "heavy 
equipment" work were as follows: 
A. Trial Court's Findings of Fact: 
1. The Plaintiff understood the agreement allowed for the Plaintiff to live on the 
Property, rent free, in exchange for his cleaning up and maintaining the Property, 
such as removing weeds, planting a garden, removing vermin and rodents, 
painting and general clean-up. The Plaintiff understood that any heavy equipment 
work he performed constituted separate and independent work, outside of the 
parties' verbal agreement for free rent, and for which plaintiff is entitled to 
monetary compensation. (R: 112-120, p. 2-3; Findings & Conclusions, Finding 
No. 8) 
2. Defendants understood the agreement called for the Plaintiff to perform all work 
on the property, including the heavy equipment work as part of his cleaning up, 
repairing and maintaining services given in exchange for free rent for life, with no 
additional monetary compensation for any of the work performed. (Id., at 3; 
Finding No. 9) 
3. Evidence supporting plaintiffs understanding of the agreement includes: 
a. In addition to the smaller equipment such as an ATV, small trailer and self 
propelled lawn mover for routine cleaning and maintenance, after the 
agreement, plaintiff spent $21,680 for the heavy equipment he needed to 
do the heavy equipment work ($15,300-backhoe, $5,200- dump trailer, 
$l,180-forks for the back hoe). 
b. Plaintiff worked for approximately 500 to 580 hours performing heavy 
equipment work. 
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c. The cost of the heavy equipment and the value of the work exceeds the 
benefit to plaintiff of living rent free in a studio apartment for the rest of 
his life. However, no evidence was presented regarding plaintiffs life 
expectancy (plaintiff is now 94 years old.) Evidence of the value of the 
benefit of living in a studio apartment varied from $200 per month to $700 
per month based on the credibility of the witnesses and how much of the 
property was used. There was no evidence that Elmer used only the 
studio apartment. (Id. at pp. 3-4, Finding Nos. lla-c) 
4. Evidence supporting Defendants' understanding of the agreement includes: 
a. The parties exchanged gifts and services between themselves as friends for 
many years without keeping a ledger, or demanding compensation. 
Defendants gave plaintiff a wood stove, and firewood for use in a former 
home, the Defendants brought appliances (gas range and water heater) for 
their studio so plaintiff could live there during the winter of 2005-06. 
Defendants allowed plaintiff to live on the property rent free during the 
winter of 2005-2006 and defendants provided paint, equipment and labor 
to help with the cleaning up, painting and removal of debris on the 
property. Defendants testified that plaintiff offered to do the heavy 
equipment work, and understood the work was a continuation of 'friends 
helping friends', and part of plaintiff s promise to clean up and maintain 
the property. 
b. Before there was an agreement for plaintiff to occupy the property in 
exchange for cleaning up the property, defendants obtained a bid to have a 
professional heavy equipment operator perform the labor of removing the 
old buildings and cement pads. Defendant did not pursue hiring a third 
party once plaintiff offered to do it as part of cleaning up the property. 
c. There was no evidence of any bid made by plaintiff, nor any agreement on 
a method of calculating compensation, nor any log of days or hours 
worked, nor any deadline for performance. 
d. Plaintiff selected the dates and hours he worked with the heavy equipment, 
working a total of approximately 500-580 hours on the project in 
approximately two years. 
e. Plaintiff never submitted a bill to defendants for his work until three years 
later when he made a demand through his attorney for compensation for 
"1500 hours of back hoe work" without an indication of the amount due. 
f. Defendants provided an open account to supply plaintiff with fuel, oil and 
services, and defendant Kenneth Hart made repairs to more than 50 flat 
tires on the back hoe while plaintiff was working on the property. (Id. at 
4-5; Finding Nos. 12(a)-(f). 
B. Trial Court's Legal Conclusions: 
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1. There is no separate agreement between the parties regarding the heavy 
equipment work. (Id. at 6; Conclusion No. 3). 
2. There was no mutual understanding or meeting of the minds between plaintiff and 
defendants that plaintiffs heavy equipment work was based on a separate 
agreement.(Id. at 6; Conclusion No. 4) 
3. The heavy equipment work performed by the plaintiff on the Property was work 
that the Plaintiff either did in exchange for living on the property rent free for the 
rest of his life, or was work he did voluntarily, as a friend helping a friend. (Id. at 
6; Conclusion No. 5) 
4. Plaintiff waived his right to claim payment for unjust enrichment, when he 
completed his work in 2008, and did not submit a bill, request for payment, or 
statement of services to plaintiff (Id. at 6; Conclusion No. 6) 
5. Although plaintiff presented evidence regarding rates charged for back hoe 
services performed by others, there was no evidence of what a reasonable amount 
of compensation would be for the work performed by plaintiff. (A/, at 7; 
Conclusion No. 7) 
6. Although there was evidence of the estimated time spent by plaintiff, there was no 
evidence that it represented a "reasonable" amount of time to do the work. (A/ at 
7; Conclusion No. 8) 
7. The Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the value by which his labors 
benefitted defendants.(Id. at 7; Conclusion No. 9) 
8. The Plaintiff s cause of action for recovery of money for heavy equipment work 
under both the contract and unjust enrichment theories should be dismissed. (Id. at 
7; Conclusion No. 10) 
C. Additional record evidence and law supporting the Trial Court's denial of 
Plaintiffs Unjust Enrichment claim for his heavy equipment work: 
Great deference is shown on appeal to the Trial Courts findings and conclusions regarding 
its balancing of equities in an unjust enrichment case. See, e.g., Rowlings v. Rowlings, 2010 UT 
52,1f45 240 P.3d 754: 
First, determining whether the circumstances surrounding the parties' interactions 
were inequitable is a fact-intensive process for which trial courts are uniquely suited. The 
nature of this equitable determination requires balancing the ramifications of an entire 
course of conduct. The trial court, having heard all of the evidence in context, is in the best 
position to undertake this balancing. Second, cases of unjust enrichment require the trial 
judge to observe facts, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the 
application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to 
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appellate courts." We are keenly aware that trial courts are in the best position to make 
determinations about credibility and veracity. This is especially the case where, as here, the 
legal standard being applied requires the court to determine what is equitable. We are also 
mindful that all of these observations will not necessarily be included in the record on 
appeal. 
II. Argument: There Is Insufficient Support for the Trial Court's Legal 
Conclusion That Defendants Were Not Unjustly Enriched by Plaintiffs 
"Heavy Equipment" Work 
The Trial Court did not correctly apply the case law regarding unjust enrichment and did 
not correctly address all of the elements of unjust enrichment in its findings and conclusions; 
accordingly, there is insufficient support for the Trial Court's legal conclusions that Defendants 
were not unjustly enriched by Plaintiffs "heavy equipment" work improving Defendants' 
property. Further, based on the elements of unjust enrichment as correctly interpreted and 
applied to the Trial Court's findings and the evidence presented, Plaintiff should have prevailed 
on his unjust enrichment claim. 
The Trial Court's finding clearly indicated that the parties did not have a "meeting of the 
minds" regarding the terms and conditions of their agreement as it applies to the heavy equipment 
work. (R: 112-120; Findings & Conclusions, Findings Nos. 8 & 9) In this case. Plaintiff claimed 
Defendants had been unjustly enriched by the work he had completed with the heavy equipment. 
Unjust enrichment Mis an action initiated by a plaintiff to recover payment for labor performed in a 
variety of circumstances in which that plaintiff, for some reason, would not be able to sue on an 
express contract." Ashby v. Ashby, 2010 UT 7, 227 P.3d 246 (Utah 2010) (citing Davies v. Olson, 
746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct.App. 1987)) Clearly, the Court's Findings did not identify the terms 
and conditions of the parties' agreement. Furthermore, the Court's Findings fail to analyze in any 
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manner the Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim. This Court should not uphold the Trial Court's 
Findings for these reasons alone. To establish his claim of unjust enrichment, Plaintiff had to 
first show he had no adequate remedy at law. Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 297, ^ 
28, 243 P.3d 500 ("It is settled in Utah that 'the law will not imply an equitable remedy when 
there is an adequate remedy at law.'" (citing UTCOAssocs., Ltd v. Zimmerman, 2001 UT App 
117, If 19, 27 P.3d 177, cert, denied, 32 P.3d 249 (Utah 2001)). 
Here, to begin with, the Trial Court ruled that there was "no separate agreement between 
the parties regarding the heavy equipment work" (R: 112-120, p.6; Findings & Conclusions, 
Conclusion No. 2), "no mutual understanding or meeting of the minds" as to the heavy 
equipment work (Id, Conclusion No. 3), and it dismissed Plaintiffs contract claim (Id., 
Conclusion No. 10). Plaintiff does not challenge this ruling on appeal; accordingly, Plaintiff 
has established that he had, and has, no adequate remedy at law with respect to seeking 
compensation for his heavy equipment work, and that the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment 
is appropriate in this case. 
To establish unjust enrichment, Plaintiff had to show (1) he conferred a benefit on 
Defendants, (2) Defendants appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit, and (3) Defendants 
accepted or retained the benefit under circumstances making it inequitable to retain the benefit 
without making payment of its value. See, e.g., Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B &LAtito, Inc., 2000 
UT 83, If 13, 12P.3d580. 
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"The first element of [unjust enrichment] requires the court to measure the benefit 
conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff." Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake 
County, 2007 UT 72, 1J26, 167 P.3d 1080. Where, as in this case, the benefit conferred is in the 
form of services, "the measure of damages, by the great weight of authority, is the reasonable value 
of the services rendered". Id. at \ 29 In order to assess the issue of whether or not the 
Defendants owe Plaintiff additional compensation for the heavy equipment, it is essential to 
determine the compensation Elmer was expected to pay for living rent-free in the studio apartment. 
The clear weight of the evidence was Plaintiff was cleaning up the property, maintaining yard 
work, fixing the studio apartment and watching and reporting trespass. Accordingly, at trial, 
Plaintiff presented expert testimony regarding the fair market value of the studio apartment rental 
(R: 330, pp. 171-178) (which the trial court found varied from $200 per month to $700 per month 
based on credibility of witnesses and how much property was used), (R: 112-120, pp. 3-4, 
Conclusion No. l i e ) , as well as expert testimony regarding the time and fair market value of 
standard yard maintenance for the property ($600/month with a senior discount, from 
approximately March/May through September/October) (R: 330, p. 88-100). At $200.00 per 
month, this is a yearly value of $2,400.00. Even if the Court were to apply $450.00 a month, that 
is approximately $5,400.00 a year in rent. The yard work value was at least $4,200.00 a year and 
that does not account for keeping the rental itself presentable and providing security to the 
property. In other words, the uncontested testimony was that Plaintiff was providing substantial 
consideration for living rent-free on the property outside heavy equipment work. Furthermore, 
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this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that Plaintiff did not purchase the equipment for nearly a 
year after he moved onto the property. Heavy equipment work could not have been within the 
parties' contemplation at the time Plaintiff moved onto the property. 
Plaintiff also presented uncontroverted testimony and other evidence establishing in detail 
the reasonable value of the additional heavy equipment services he had rendered, describing all of 
the heavy equipment work that he had accomplished, (R: 330, pp. 112-115, 120-123, 125-129, 
131-137, 159-162), and the fact that he had spent 500 to 580 hours doing this work. (R: 330, pp. 
141-148; R: 112-120, Findings & Conclusions, Finding No. 12(d)). Plaintiff also presented 
testimony that the market value of a backhoe with an operator was $80/hour while operating, and 
$35/hour while on standby. (R: 330, pp. 81-85, and even Defendants testified that they had 
previously hired a backhoe with an operator for $65/hour (R: 330, pp. 271-272). Based upon 
the Plaintiffs uncontroverted evidence, Plaintiff provided $46,400.00 (580 x $80.00) worth of 
service for the Defendants over and above the compensation for living rent-free. 
The Plaintiff argues that the Trial Court erred in the following legal conclusions regarding 
this issue: "Although plaintiff presented evidence regarding rates charged for back hoe services 
performed by others, there was no evidence of what a reasonable amount of compensation would 
be for the work performed by plaintiff;" that "although there was evidence of the estimated time 
spent by plaintiff, there was no evidence that it represented a 'reasonable' amount of time to do 
the work;" and that "Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the value by which his labors benefitted 
defendants." (R: 112-120, pp. 6-7, Conclusion Nos. 5-7.) 
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The Plaintiff believes the Trial Court's findings were in error for the following reasons: 
The Defendants never presented evidence to challenge (1) Plaintiffs accounting of his time spent; 
(2) Plaintiffs competency in accomplishing the heavy equipment work at a fairly good pace 
despite his age; (3) Plaintiffs accounting of all of the improvements that he made to Defendants' 
property; and (4) Plaintiffs expert testimony as to the cost of the work performed. (See, e.g., R: 
330, pp. 259, 309-310). In fact, the Defendants testified that Plaintiffs work was professional 
and met appropriate standards. R.330, p. 259. In coming to these conclusions, the Trial Court 
apparently applied the wrong legal standard in measuring the benefit conferred. The Court found 
that"[t]he Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the value by which his labor benefitted 
Defendants." See, R. 112-120, Conclusion No. 9. However, as stated herein, the law clearly 
states and holds that when services are provided, the value of the services is to be used as the 
measure of damages. 
At trial, Defendants countered Plaintiff s evidence regarding the reasonable value of 
Plaintiffs services by quoting inapplicable case law that stood for the proposition that under the 
theory of unjust enrichment, Plaintiff could only claim the increase of value to the property. As 
stated by Defendants' counsel: 
We, again, take the position that there's no proof on measure of damages, Your 
Honor. Measure of damages or unjust enrichment, as set forth in Bailey Allen Company, 
Inc., vs. Kerzett [sic], which is found at 878 P.2d 421 in 1994, states that the benefit 
conferred on the defendant and not the plaintiffs detriment for the reasonable value of the 
services is the measure of the recovery. We have no testimony as to what the benefit, if 
there was a benefit." 
(R: 330, p. 218). And in closing arguments, Defendants' counsel again countered: 
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So, you then look to the unjust enrichment claim. And, as I indicated previously, 
the Bailey Allen Company vs. Kerzett [sic] case says you don't look at the detriment, you 
look at the benefit. Did we have an appraisal of the property before and after? No, we did 
not. Had we had an appraisal, then, perhaps we would have something to talk about. . . . 
Again, benefit conferred. What is the benefit conferred? We don't have the value of the 
property before and the value of the property after." 
(R: 330, p. 312). 
Instead, as stated above, the Utah Supreme Court has held that where the benefit is in the 
form of services, "the measure of damages, by the great weight of authority, is the reasonable value 
of the services rendered." Emergency Physicians, 2007 UT 72, f^ 29, 167 P. 3d 1080; see also 
Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315 ("Furthermore, [t]he benefit conferred on the defendant, and 
not the plaintiffs detriment or the reasonable value of its services, is the measure of recovery." 
Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Inv. Mgmt, LLC, 2006 UT App 331, ^ 36, 153 P.3d 714 
(internal quotation marks omitted). But see Emergency Physicians, 2007 UT 72, ^ 29, 167 P.3d 
1080 (holding that where the benefit is in the form of services, "the measure of damages, by the 
great weight of authority, is the reasonable value of the services rendered")). The Plaintiffs 
undisputed testimony regarding the value of his heavy machine work was $85.00 an hour. 
The Trial Court apparently followed the Defendants' mistaken legal reasoning, as its legal 
conclusions on this issue completely ignored the detailed evidence presented by the Plaintiff at 
trial, which was not challenged by opposing evidence from the Defendants. In short, under the 
applicable case law, Plaintiff establishes that he provided at least nearly $46,400.00 worth of 
services on behalf of the Defendants without compensation. That is the measure of damage since 
Defendants failed to present any alternative theory of damages. Thus, Plaintiff sufficiently 
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demonstrated the value of the benefit conferred on Defendants by his services, and the trial court's 
legal conclusions with respect to this element of unjust enrichment should not stand. 
Next, Plaintiff also proved, with respect to this first element of the benefit conferred, that 
Defendants received not just an incidental benefit, but a windfall. As stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court, "It is not enough that a benefit was conferred on the defendant, rather, the 
enrichment to the defendant must be unjust in that the defendant received a true windfall or 
'something for nothing.5 " Emergency Physicians at ^ 26 (quoting 66 Am. Jur.2d Restitution and 
Implied Contracts § 13 (2001)). Importantly, the evidence presented at trial did show that 
Defendants received "something for nothing." In fact, the Court found that cost of the heavy 
equipment and the value of the work exceeds the benefit to Plaintiff living rent-free for the rest 
of his life. 112-120, Findings No. 11 a-c. To recap, the evidence shows that the original 
agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendants was that Plaintiff moved to the property in 
exchange for making the building livable, reporting trespassers and maintaining the surrounding 
area through regular yard work. (R: 330, pp. 10-11) This was the parties' agreement in during 
the winter of 2005-2006. (R: 330, pp. 234-235, 274-279). Not until October 2006, at least six 
months after Plaintiff moved to the property and entered into this rental agreement, did he 
purchase the heavy equipment at issue - backhoe, dump trailer and forks. {Id. at 73, 76-77, 279). 
Significantly, contrary to Defendants' testimony, {Id. at 234-235, 276) heavy equipment work 
could not have been included in the agreement to live rent free, when the Plaintiff did not even 
own the backhoe when the agreement was made. In fact, ait that time Plaintiff was not even 
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looking for equipment. The testimony was that when the heavy equipment work was needed to 
fill a hole, Plaintiff hired the work done. (R: 300, pp. 57-59) Only after Plaintiff purchased the 
backhoe, did Defendants request that Plaintiff perform additional services to the property - i.e.: 
remove buildings and level ground. Plaintiffs position is that the heavy equipment work was 
outside the parties' agreement to provide security against trespassers and to do yard work 
maintenance around the actual living area in exchange for living rent free. (R: 330, p. 299). 
Defendants never argued nor did they present evidence that Plaintiff ever breached the original 
agreement of making the residence habitable, of reporting trespass and maintaining the 
surrounding area; the only evidence presented was rather that Plaintiff fully performed these 
duties and that Defendants were happy with his work. (R: 330, pp. 71-73, 259, 261, 309.) 
In sum, based on the applicable case law, the findings and evidence in this matter do 
show the first element of unjust enrichment, that Defendants not only received a benefit, they 
received a "true windfall." 
Next, as to the second element of unjust enrichment, Plaintiff had to prove the 
Defendants "appreciate^] or ha[d] knowledge of the benefit." See, e.g., Estate ofHigley v. 
State, Dept. of Tramp., 2010 UT App 227, If 19, 238 P.3d 1089 (citing Allen v. Hall 2006 UT 
70,1f 26, 148 P.3d 939). Here, the Trial Court's recited Findings lack any facts which would 
support the position that Defendants were unaware of or did not appreciate the benefit of 
receiving Plaintiffs heavy equipment work- in fact, just the opposite. (See Findings & 
Conclusions) Rather, the Trial Court's findings show that Defendants appreciated or had 
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knowledge of the benefit conferred, inasmuch as Defendants testified that they had previously 
"obtained a bid to have a professional heavy equipment operator perform the labor of removing 
the old buildings and cement pads." (R: 330, p.238-239; Findings & Conclusions, Finding No. 
12(b)). Further, at trial Plaintiff testified that Defendant Kenneth Hart himself drove the 
Plaintiff around to look at heavy equipment, that he was there when Plaintiff negotiated the 
purchase of the backhoe, and that he knew exactly what Plaintiff paid for the heavy equipment. 
(R: 330, p. 75-79). Finally, Defendants' testimony at trial was that they saved money by 
having Plaintiff do the work (R: 330, pp. 270), and that they knew what it cost to rent a backhoe 
with an operator because they had done so before (R: 330, pp. 271-272). The Plaintiff clearly 
establishes this element. 
Next, as to the third element, the standard for determining whether the Defendants had 
been unjustly enriched required the Trial Court to determine whether the Defendants accepted 
and retained benefits conferred by Plaintiff "under such circumstances as to make it inequitable 
for Defendants to retain those benefits without compensating the Plaintiff." See, e.g., Estate of 
Higley v. State, Dept. of Tramp., 2010 UT App 227, ^ 19, 238 P.3d 1089. Here, the Trial Court 
did not correctly address this third element under applicable case law. The Trial Court 
determined that Defendants did not need to pay Plaintiff for any of his "heavy equipment" work 
with the backhoe (R: 112-120, p. 7; Findings & Conclusion, Conclusion No. 10), and that 
Plaintiffs 500 to 580 hours of heavy equipment work was either work done in exchange for free 
rent, or voluntarily as a friend helping a friend. (Id. at Finding No. 11, Conclusion No. 5). 
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These findings and conclusions essentially assume that because Plaintiff received free rent, and 
because the parties were friends, Defendants' acceptance of Plaintiff s free work could not be 
unjust. (See Id. at Conclusion Nos. 11-14). However, these findings do not sufficiently address 
or support the legal conclusion that Defendants' conduct in retaining the benefit conferred by 
Plaintiff was not inequitable ~ especially when the testimony indicated that Plaintiff had asked 
Defendants for payment for his heavy equipment work as far back as 2008 (R: 330, pp. 141, 
316). Analogous to this case, in Rowlings v. Rawlings, 2010 UT 52, 240 P.3d 754, siblings had 
transferred title to a family farm to their brother, but they still made improvements to the farm 
over the years based on their erroneous belief that the farm was a family farm and still somehow 
belonged to them. In addressing the siblings' unjust enrichment claim filed against their 
brother, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed their argument as follows: 
In [Jeffs], the United Effort Plan Trust (the "UEP") owned title to land. 
Members of a religious group affiliated with the trust were permitted to occupy the land. 
The UEP encouraged these occupants to make improvements to the land by leading them 
to believe they could occupy the land for their lifetimes. After they were removed from 
the land, the occupants brought a number of claims, including claims for unjust 
enrichment, against the UEP. The UEP defended on the grounds that, because the 
occupants knew the UEP held title to the land when they made improvements, it was not 
unjust for the UEP to keep those improvements even after the occupants were no longer 
permitted to reside on the land. Relying on the Restatement of Restitution, we rejected 
the UEP's position, and held that" an owner 'cannot retain a benefit which knowingly he 
has permitted another to confer upon him by mistake.' " 
Rawlings at ^ 49. 
The Supreme Court concluded: "Put simply, even if the court of appeals correctly 
concluded that [Defendant] owned the farm property, this did not insulate [his] conduct from 
being inequitable." Id. Similarly, in this case, even though the Trial Court correctly concluded 
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that there was no meeting of minds between the parties regarding the heavy equipment work, and 
even if the Defendants' testimony is true that they would never have allowed Plaintiff to do the 
work had they known that he wanted payment, this does not insulate Defendants' conduct - i.e., 
accepting all of Plaintiff s valuable work without additional payment - from being inequitable. 
As set forth above, the testimony at trial showed that Defendants received a significant and 
measurable benefit approaching $50,000.00. This is truly in the nature of a true "windfall" 
when Plaintiff performed all of the heavy equipment work on their property, and Defendants 
knew it. Regardless of whether or not Defendants truly believed Plaintiffs 500 to 580 hours of 
heavy-duty equipment work was all being done in exchange for free rent or as a friend, the facts 
show that for years Defendants encouraged Plaintiffs use of the heavy equipment to improve 
their Property; they watched as he graded the Property, brought in fill, built fences, removed 
many large dilapidated structures and heavy concrete pads, and planted trees. (R: 330, pp 
112-115, 120-123, 125-129, 131-137, 159-162). Further, as noted by the Trial Court's in its 
Finding 1 l.e: "The cost of the heavy equipment, and the value of the work, exceeds the benefit to 
the Plaintiff of living rent free in the studio apartment for the rest of his life." (R: 112-120, p. 
3) In short, the circumstances of this case - the evidence submitted at trial regarding the quality, 
quantity and value of the heavy equipment work performed by Plaintiff for Defendants, in 
addition to all of the regular yard work and maintenance he performed, in contrast with the value 
of the "free rent" being given to Plaintiff by the Defendants ~ show that it was inequitable for 
Defendants to accept Plaintiff s work without compensating him. 
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Finally, the Trial Court also concluded that "The Plaintiff waived his right to claim 
payment for unjust enrichment when he completed his work in 2008, and did not submit a bill, 
request for payment or statement of services to the Defendants." (Id, Conclusion No. 6). 
However, again, at trial Plaintiff testified that in September 2008 he verbally informed 
Defendants he would do no more work until he was paid. (R: 330, pp. 141, 316). Further, 
"waiver" is a legal term of art, and Defendants themselves waived this affirmative defense by 
failing to properly raise it as an affirmative defense in their answers. See Answer R: 6-11 and 
Amended Answer R:45-50 Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure at the time of filing 
required that "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... waiver." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c)(superceded 11/1/2011); see Fibro Trust Inc. v. Brahman Fin., Inc., 1999 UT 
13,^7, 974 P.2d 288 . Additionally, the Trial Court should not have raised this defense of 
"waiver" itself because the record shows that the parties also did not try the issue during the 
bench trial by either implied or express consent as mandated by Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See R: 330, pp. 216-228, 314; Eldredge v. Farnsworth, 2007 UTApp 243, 
1f36,1f38, 166P.3d 639 (citingArchuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1998) (express or 
implied consent of the parties must be evident from the record, and, a party does not try issues by 
consent by a mere mention of the issue). Therefore, the Court's legal conclusion that Plaintiff 
"waived" his right to claim compensation is not supported from the pleadings or the record. 
In conclusion, there is insufficient support for the Trial Court's legal conclusion that 
Defendants were not unjustly enriched by Plaintiffs "heavy equipment" work. Rather, based 
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on the elements of unjust enrichment as correctly interpreted and applied to the Trial Court's 
findings and the evidence presented, it would be inequitable to allow the Defendants to benefit 
by all of Plaintiff s heavy equipment work without compensating him. For these reasons, the 
Plaintiff should have prevailed on his unjust enrichment claim with respect to his heavy 
equipment work. 
ISSUE 3: UNDER APPLICABLE "CONTRACT" LAW AND "UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT" LAW, THE TRIAL COURT1 S FACTUAL 
FINDINGS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION 
THAT DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RETAIN THE 50% 
INTEREST IN PLAINTIFF'S BACKHOE, 
I. Marshalling Requirement: Evidence Supporting Trial Court's Legal Conclusion 
The Trial Court's legal conclusion that uThe Plaintiffs causes of action for 
judgment against the Defendants [for the backhoe] based on either an expectation of payment or 
upon unjust enrichment should be denied" (R: 112-120, p. 7; Findings & Conclusions, Conclusion 
No. 14) is not sufficiently supported by the evidence. Although there appears to be consensus 
regarding most of the facts, Plaintiff will first still marshal the evidence. See Jacobsen v. 
Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161 ("Even where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal 
ruling, ... if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is 
extremely fact-sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to marshal the evidence. "XCiting Chen v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, If 20, 100 P.3d 1177). 
A. Court's Ruling. First, the Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions with respect to 
the backhoe are: 
1. Court's Conclusions of Law 
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a. Plaintiff transferred one half of his interest in the Case 580 back hoe to 
Defendant. (R: 112-120, p. 7; Findings & Conclusions, Conclusion No. 11) 
b. Contracts for the sale of personal property involving compensation in 
excess of $500.00 must be in writing to be enforceable (See Section 
70A-2-201. Id. at Conclusion No. 12. 
c. Plaintiffs Bill of Sale acknowledges the transfer of title is predicated up 
(sic) plaintiffs receipt of "other valuable consideration" which was paid to 
plaintiff. Id. at Conclusion No. 13. 
d. The Plaintiffs causes of action for judgment against the Defendants based 
on either an expectation of payment or upon unjust enrichment should be 
denied. Id. at Conclusion No. 14. 
2. Court's Findings of Fact Supporting the Court's Conclusions of Law 
a. Plaintiff spent $21,680 for the heavy equipment he needed to do the heavy 
equipment work ($15,300 - backhoe; $5,200 - dump trailer; $1,180 - forks 
for the back hoe). Id. at p.3; Finding 11 .a. 
b. Plaintiff executed a Bill of Sale identifying Kenneth Hart and Robert L. 
Kipler as the new owners of the Case 580C backhoe. This Bill of Sale is 
without date. Id. at p. 5, Finding 13. 
c. Plaintiff executed transfers of title of many vehicles from himself to his son 
on or about the same day as he executed the Bill of Sale. Id. at Finding 14. 
d. The Plaintiff intended to divest himself of ownership of his vehicles on that 
day, giving all to his son except for a 50% interest in the backhoe, which 
50% interest he transferred to Defendant Kenneth Hart. Id. at Findings 15. 
e. The Bill of Sale indicates, in part, "in consideration of valuable 
consideration Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable consideration, paid to me 
by Kenneth Hart and Robert L. Kipler, I Elmer F. Bowen, do hereby sell 
and convey to the buyer the following vehicle." Id. at Findings 16. 
f. Defendant Kenneth Hart paid $10.00 to the Plaintiff while both were in the 
bank where the Bill of Sale was notarized. Id. at pp. 5-6, Findingsl7. 
g. There was no written promissory note and no written contract indicating 
that additional consideration needed to be paid in the future. Id. at p. 6, 
Finding 18. 
h. The Plaintiff did not file a lien on the backhoe to protect an anticipated 
payment of any money from the Defendants. Id. at Finding 19. 
i.. The Plaintiff delivered the Bill of Sale and the equipment to Defendant 
Kenneth Hart after the Bill of Sale was signed. Id. at Finding 20. 
Other Evidence Supporting Trial Court's Conclusion 14 Re: the Backhoe 
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At trial, Defendant Kenneth Hart testified that "valuable consideration" to him meant a 
place to live, taking Plaintiff hunting, fixing his car, and there were "lots of valuable 
considerations" (R: 330, p. 284), and he also testified that he paid Plaintiff the $10.00 {Id. at 267), 
which the Trial Court accepted as true (R. 112-120, pp. 5-6; Findings & Conclusions, Finding No. 
17). In contrast, Plaintiff testified that to him, valuable consideration meant money or service, 
about $15,000.00 which he paid for the backhoe (R: 330, Pgs. 104-05 and 203). Also, the Bill of 
Sale itself uses the word "paid," which normally has a past tense connotation. (Bill of Sale, 
Exhibit A). 
Defendants' attorney also argued that Plaintiffs transfer of the backhoe was done for 
estate planning purposes (R: 330, pp. 185-187), meaning that Plaintiff transferred the backhoe to 
Defendants essentially for free as an inheritance. The Defendant supports this argument with 
evidence that on or about the same day that Plaintiff executed the Bill of Sale to Kenneth Hart 
and Plaintiffs son, Plaintiff also divested himself of title to many other vehicles, transferring title 
to his son (R: 330 pp. 264-65; R: 112-120, p.5; Finding Nos. 14 and 15). This argument was also 
supported by Defendants' testimony that at the time of the transfer of the backhoe Plaintiff told 
him that he was "getting his affairs in order" and wanted him to have the backhoe. (R: 330, pp. 
265-267). 
Defendants' attorney furthered argued that Plaintiffs transfer of the backhoe to Kenneth 
Hart was an "unconditional gift" under Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213, 163 P.3d 747 (R: 
330 p. 228), meaning that if the evidence was that Plaintiff intended to give the backhoe free of 
44 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
any conditions at the time of transfer (such as payment in return), he could not later revoke the 
gift. Plaintiff also testified that he did not require his son, who received the other half interest 
in the backhoe, to pay him money for his 50 percent interest. 
II. Fatal Flaws Regarding the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
After marshaling the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling, Plaintiff is obligated to 
"ferret out [the] fatal flaw." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). Here, the first "fatal flaw" is that the Trial Court did not identify, regarding the 
backhoe, the terms and conditions of the parties5 agreement. This factual determination is 
essential in determining whether or not the parties had formed an enforceable contract and if so 
whether the parties complied with the agreement. Here, Plaintiff claimed that Defendants 
breached their agreement because they failed to pay 'Valuable consideration" for the backhoe, as 
the bill of sale indicated. The second flaw, somewhat predicated upon the first flaw, is the remedy 
that flows if the parties did not come to a "meeting of the mind" regarding the exchange. If there 
was no agreement as to the consideration, there was no contract, the Defendants are obligated to 
return the backhoe. Even under the applicable law regarding unjust enrichment, the backhoe 
should be returned based upon Plaintiffs "Unjust Enrichment" claim. The Trial Court failed to 
analyze Plaintiffs "breach of contract" claim, nor did it analyze his "unjust enrichment" claim. 
The beginning place to determine the parties' rights is to determine whether or not a 
contract was formed. A formation of a contract requires an offer, an acceptance, and 
consideration. See, e.g., Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Manias, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985). Also, 
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"For an offer to be one that would create a valid and binding contract, its terms must be definite 
and unambiguous." DCMInv. Corp. v. Pinecrest Inv. Co., 34 P.3d 785. The obligations of the 
parties must be "set forth with sufficient defmiteness that [the contract] can be performed." Ferris 
v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1979). "The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if 
they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate 
remedy." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2). To form a contract, there must be an 
acceptance of the offer: "An acceptance is a manifestation of assent to an offer, such that an 
objective, reasonable person is justified in understanding that a fully enforceable contract has been 
made." Cal Wadsworth Constr. Co. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995). Of 
course, the offer and the acceptance must have definite terms so that there is a "meeting of the 
minds" to determine that there has been an "unconditionally assent to all material terms presented 
in the offer, including price and method of performance, or it is a rejection of the offer." Id. There 
also must be consideration for the contract: "Consideration is present when there is an act or 
promise given in exchange for the other party's promise." Healthcare Servs. Group Inc. v. Utah 
Dep't of Health 2002 UT 5, ^  17, 40 P.3d 591. 
As the legal discussion above indicates, there must be a "meeting of the minds," an offer, 
an acceptance and terms sufficient to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the 
contract. Here, the evidence from the Trial Court's own findings shows that Plaintiff paid 
$15,300.00 for the backhoe and that the Defendant Kenneth Hart was present when the Plaintiff 
purchased the backhoe. (R: 112-120, p.3; Finding No. 1 l.a). This is significant in that the 
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Defendants had full knowledge of the value of the backhoe. Plaintiff then deliberately transferred 
a 50% interest in that backhoe to Defendant Kenneth Hart when he executed the Bill of Sale. (Id. at 
p.5, Finding Nos. 13-15). 
It appears that the Trial Court found that the "bill of sale" constituted the contract between 
the parties and also concluded that the Plaintiff did receive "valuable consideration" with the 
payment of the $10.00. (Id. at p. 7; Conclusion No. 13). It is important to note that the Trial 
Court did not find the backhoe was presented to the Defendants as a gift. The error regarding the 
Court's conclusions is that language of the Bill of Sale states as follows: "in consideration of 
valuable consideration Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable consideration." [Italicized indicates 
hand written]. The Trial Court completely disregards the ambiguity of this double reference. 
The Court seems to imply that the first handwritten "valuable consideration" immediately before 
the $10.00 handwritten figure has reference to the $10.00 that Kenneth Hart paid, but the Court 
makes no conclusions as to what the second "and other valuable consideration" exactly 
constitutes. So it is impossible to interpret from the bill of sale what sum of money or what the 
second "other valuable consideration" referenced meant to the parties. 
Where a contract is missing a term (or includes a term for that matter) that renders it 
ambiguous, the fact-finding body has the responsibility to consider the "extrinsic evidence" to 
determine the intent of the parties, and "the discernment of this intent is a question of fact" with 
deference granted to the decision. Ivory Homes, Ltd., v Utah State Tax Commission, 2011 UT 54, 
ffif 12, 15, 41, 266 P.3d 751. Again, here the undisputed facts indicate that the Plaintiff provided 
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substantial value to the Defendants: Kenneth Hart received a 50% interest in a backhoe of which 
he knows Elmer just paid $15,300.00. On the other hand, Elmer Bowen received in exchange 
what amounts to a boilerplate recitation of the $10.00 Kenneth Hart claims to have paid. (R: 
112-120, pp. 5-6; Finding Nos. 16, 17; R: 330 P. 279) Defendants' testimony regarding "valuable 
consideration" included only vague references to taking Plaintiff hunting, fixing his car, and also 
referring to allowing Elmer a place to live (R: 330 p. 284), which also happens to be the 
consideration the Defendants claimed to have exchanged for the free rent and heavy equipment 
work. In short, the findings demonstrate that if the Court allows the Bill of Sale to constitute a 
contract that was fully executed by the disputed payment of $10.00, it allowed the Defendants 
nothing short of a "true windfall." 
The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that the parties did not have a "meeting of the 
minds" if the Defendant believes he only was required to pay $10.00 and other vague 
consideration. Defendants argued that the language of the Bill of Sale indicated a fully executed 
contract, in that the language provided that the consideration was already "paid." This argument is 
without merit. "Paid," as demonstrated by the clear action of the parties, was not meant to 
indicate that Elmer had received full consideration. Instead, the agreement was executory in 
nature, evidenced by the fact that "valuable consideration" was stated twice. The Defendants also 
testified, as stated above, that part of the "valuable consideration" was that Elmer was allowed to 
live in the future rent free on the property. The Defendant also testified, contrary to Elmer's 
testimony, that he paid the $10.00 as they were leaving the bank, meaning that the $10.00 was paid 
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after the bill of sale had been signed. This is executory in nature. To summarize, the evidence 
and the Trial Court's own Findings actually indicate there was not a meeting of the minds as to 
what the valuable consideration was that was mentioned in the "bill of sale." Accordingly, the 
parties did not form a legally binding contract. 
Next, the Defendants also argued that the backhoe was an unconditional gift or 
advancement on an inheritance from Plaintiff to Defendants. (R: 330, p. 264-267) The Court, 
however, does not state in the Findings and Conclusions or in the Order that it considered the 
transfer of the backhoe as a gift or advancement, or even that it was intended as such by the 
Plaintiff. {See R: 112-120) To determine whether a gift is absolute or conditional, the court must 
examine the donor's intent, which is resolved from the express declarations by the donor at the 
time of the making of the gift or from the circumstances. Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213, 
163 P.3d 747. (R: 330, p. 228). Yet the Trial Court never addressed Plaintiffs intent and never 
used the word "gift." Its findings only recite that the Plaintiff had transferred his interest in the 
backhoe to Kenneth Hart (R: 112-120, p. 7, Conclusion No. 11), that contracts for the sale of 
personal property in excess of $500.00 must be writing to be enforceable {Id. at Conclusion No. 
12), and that the Bill of Sale "acknowledges that the transfer of title is predicated upon the 
Plaintiffs receipt of "other valuable consideration,' which was paid to the Plaintiff." {Id. at 
Conclusion No. 13). Theses rulings seem to indicate that the Trial Court was not persuaded by 
Defendant's "gift" argument. Importantly, at trial, counsel for Plaintiff revealed that Defendants 
"gift" argument was completely new and different from its earlier position in Defendants' 
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responses and earlier letter from counsel. For example, Defendant Kenneth Hart testified in 
response to Plaintiffs Counsel as follows: 
Q All right. Let's go on then. Would you agree on page 9, paragraph K [Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 16, Interrogatory] that it says that the valuable consideration, and it's in quotation, 
provided by the defendant, was a place for the plaintiff to live rent free? The dump trailer belongs 
to the Plaintiff s son? Isn't that what it says? 
A That's what it says. Valuable consideration being cleaning the buildings. 
Q So, it wasn't a gift? 
A It was. 
Q The backhoe wasn't a gift? Didn't you sign a document on that date saying you got 
the backhoe as a result of him living for free? 
A That's the way I understood it. 
Q Okay. So, it wasn't a gift? It was in consideration of his living there for free? 
A No, not necessarily. Because valuable consideration went back a long, long time 
before he moved up there. But I'm sure that was part of it. 
Q Okay. Did you, in these paragraphs, say the valuable consideration were things that 
you gave him prior to the time he moved up? 
A I would say a lot if it is valuable for that. It was a lot valuable to have a place to live. 
There was a lot valuable to fix his car. There was valuable consideration to take him hunting 
when - there are lots of valuable consideration. 
Q Your Honor, are they changing the theory again that it does include that? 
Q All right. But you would agree with me that the thing you signed said that the 
valuable consideration that referred to was that you provided the plaintiff a place to live rent free? 
That's what it says, correct? 
A Yeah. For the work he did and valuable consideration. So, he can live there rent free. 
(R: 330, pp. 283-85) 
Next, Plaintiff submitted Trial Exhibit 17, a letter dated May 4, 2009, sent by counsel for 
Defendants, and elicited the following testimony from Kenneth Hart: 
A Yep Jim sent it. I authorized it and he sent it. 
Q Now, does it say anywhere in there that the backhoe was a gift? 
A No. 
Q In fact, doesn't it again say what you also stated in your response, that the backhoe 
was part of the valuable consideration - or doing work on the property was also part of the valuable 
consideration? 
A I guess that's what it says. 
(R: 330, p. 287) 
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In this matter, there was a "bill of sale" which contained the language "In consideration of 
valuable consideration Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable consideration, paid to me by Kenneth 
Hart & Robert L. Kipler . . . ." (Italicized words represent was added by handwriting). The 
Defendant presented case law that allegedly stood for the proposition that a gift could not be 
revoked unless there was a condition given with the gift. However, in Ross v. Producers Mut. Ins. 
Co., 4 Utah 2d 396, 295 P.2d 339 (Utah 1956) the Utah Supreme Court held as follows: "We agree, 
of course, that mutuality of obligation is an essential element of the contract. A plea that a contract 
is defective in this regard is really a statement that the contract lacks consideration. Consequently 
the issue posed is whether, considering the contract as a whole, the plaintiffs here were left without 
valid consideration for their promise." Citing, 1 Williston, Contracts 504, Sec. 141 (Rev.Ed.); 17 
C. J.S., Contracts, § 100, p. 443 ff. See also England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997) where 
the Utah Supreme Court upheld the district court's finding that there was no contract because the 
contract lacked consideration and "would be to permit one party to retain what appears to be an 
unjust enrichment of $169,501.75." 
At some point, it is helpful to summarize what consideration the Plaintiff was paying and 
what he was receiving to determine the issues of whether or not a contract was reached, whether or 
not there was a breach and whether or not the Defendants were unjustly enriched. In the matter, 
the Plaintiff paid the following consideration: 1) Elmer took care of the yard work around the 
studio apartment-valued at least $4,200.00 a year; 2) Elmer cleaned and repaired the property to 
make it livable and watched for trespassers-easily valued at the difference between $4,200.00 for 
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the yard work and the rental value of the studio apartment; 3) a backhoe a year after moving onto 
the property that Elmer had purchased for $15,300.00; and 4) heavy equipment work valued at 
nearly $50,000.00. What did Elmer receive in exchange for this consideration? A very decrepit 
studio apartment that had a value of $2,400.00 according to the Plaintiff s expert. The gross 
difference in the values received clearly demonstrate that the Plaintiffs agreement to make the 
studio apartment livable, do yard work and watch for trespassers was the only consideration that he 
agreed to pay for renting free in the studio apartment. The backhoe and the heavy machine work 
has to be analyzed separately in that these transactions occurred substantially after the Plaintiff 
moved onto the property and if included as part of the consideration creates a substantial unequal 
payment of consideration. 
The second flaw here is the Trial Court's failure to apply Plaintiffs requested equitable 
remedy of unjust enrichment once the parties did not come to a "meeting of the mind" regarding 
the exchange. In other words, where there was no agreement as to the consideration, there was no 
contract, and the backhoe should have been ordered returned based upon either Plaintiffs "breach 
of contract" claim or "unjust enrichment" claim. 
Again, the elements of unjust enrichment are: (1) a benefit conferred, (2) appreciation or 
knowledge of the benefit, and (3) acceptance or retention of the benefit under circumstances 
making it inequitable to retain the benefit without making payment of its value. See, e.g., Desert 
Miriah, Inc. v. B &L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, H 13, 12 P.3d 580. Here, even though Plaintiff 
deliberately transferred his interest in the backhoe to Defendants, this does not support the finding 
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that Defendants' conduct in knowingly retaining that valuable interest, together with all of the 
other benefits conferred upon them by Plaintiff, was not inequitable under the circumstances, 
especially when Plaintiff had asked for the return of the backhoe or payment for his heavy 
equipment work in 2008. (R: 330, pp. 141, 316). 
Again, Defendants' receipt and retention of Plaintiff s interest in the backhoe here is 
similar to the circumstances of Rowlings v. Rowlings, 2010 UT 52, 240 P. 3d 754, described in 
detail above, where siblings brought an unjust enrichment claim against their brother for 
improvements they had made to a farm after they had already knowingly transferred title to him. 
There, the defendant brother defended by arguing that his siblings could not establish unjust 
enrichment because they had known all along that he held title. The Utah Supreme Court rejected 
this argument and referred to its ruling in the similar/<?$? case, where it "held that 'an owner 
'cannot retain a benefit which knowingly he has permitted another to confer upon him by 
mistake.'" Rowlings at ^ 49. The Court concluded: "Put simply, even if the court of appeals 
correctly concluded that [Defendant] owned the farm property, this did not insulate [his] conduct 
from being inequitable." Id. Again, in this case even though the Trial Court correctly concluded 
that Plaintiff did transfer the backhoe to Kenneth Hart, this does not insulate Hart's conduct, i.e., 
retaining this valuable interest without paying for its value or returning the backhoe when Elmer 
requested it. As set forth above, Defendants received a measurable benefit in the nature of a 
"windfall" when Plaintiff transferred the backhoe to them, and they knew it. In addition, the Trial 
Court had already determined that Defendants did not need to pay Plaintiff for any of his "heavy 
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equipment" work with the backhoe (R: 112-120, Findings & Conclusion, Conclusion No. 10), that 
Plaintiffs 500 to 580 hours of heavy equipment work was either work done in exchange for free 
rent, or voluntarily as a friend helping a friend. {Id. at Finding No. 11, Conclusion No. 5). 
Regardless of whether or not Defendants truly believed this heavy equipment work was all being 
done in exchange for free rent, they could not have also thought they were receiving the backhoe 
for the same consideration. Again, as noted by the Trial Court's in its Finding 11 .e: "The cost of 
the heavy equipment, and the value of the work, exceeds the benefit to the Plaintiff of living rent 
free in the studio apartment for the rest of his life." In sum, the evidence submitted at trial, 
together with the Trial Court's own findings and conclusions, taken as true here, show that under 
the circumstances of this case, it was inequitable for Defendants to retain the 50% interest in the 
backhoe. 
ISSUE 4: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING 
TO CONSIDER PLAINTIFFS RULE 60(b) MOTION 
The procedural history regarding this issue is as follows: 
1. The Court signed the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on April 21, 
2011. 
2. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Judgment or set aside judgment on or about May 9, 2011 
asking for the following relief 
a. That the Court should consider issues that had arisen between the parties relating to 
what Elmer Bowen was required to do in the future to reside on the property 
without further compensation and whether or not the Utah Code Section 57-22-1 
applies to their agreement. 
b. The Plaintiff argued that the Order should be set aside because Defendant failed to 
comply with Rule 7, which had the effect of not allowing the Plaintiff proper notice 
that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were being presented to the Court 
for signature so that he could exercise other rules of procedure that had effect on his 
legal options. 
3. On May 17, 2011, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. 
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4. On July 21, 2011, the Court denied the Plaintiffs Motion to Amend believing that the 
Court lacked jurisdiction because the Plaintiff had filed a Notice of Appeal. 
5. On or about August 29., 2012, the Plaintiff filed a Rule 60 motion to reconsider pointing out 
that Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(b) allows the Court to consider Rule 59 and 60 
Motions even after an appeal has been sought. 
6. On or about November 3, 2011, the Court agreed that it had erred by finding it lacked 
jurisdiction because a Notice of Appeal had been entered; however, the Court denied the 
Plaintiffs May 9th Motion to Amend and Set Aside finding that the Motion was not timely 
iled because there is no allowance for the three days mailing. 
The Plaintiff filed a Rule 60 Motion to set aside the April 21, 2011 judgment only because 
it had been entered without notice to the Plaintiff, so that he could protect his Rule 59 rights. The 
Plaintiff believes that the piecemeal approach the Trial Court used to address his May 9th Motion 
ignored the Plaintiffs purpose of filing both a Rule 60 and a Rule 59 Motion. 
First, the Court's November 3, 2011 order failed to address the Plaintiffs Rule 60 motion 
that the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law should be set aside in that the Defendants 
failed to comply with the Notice requirements of Rule 7 giving the Plaintiff appropriate notice that 
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were being presented to the Court. (R. 
282-285). Because the Defendants failed to comply with Rule 7, the Plaintiff did not have proper 
notice that an order was being presented, that the period of time to object was running or that the 
time period pursuant to Rule 59 would begin to run if an order was entered. 
The Trial Court thus abused its discretion when it refused to consider Plaintiffs Motion to 
Amend Judgment or Set Aside Judgment under Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Instead, the Court 
found that Plaintiff failed under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 to identify "any of the grounds for 
relief enumerated in rule 60(b) or to state "with particularity the relief sought pursuant to Rule 
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60(b)." (R: 221-225, Memorandum Decision, Exhibit M) The Trial Court should have 
considered the Motion because the plain language of Plaintiff s Rule 60(b) Motion and his 
Memorandum in Support of Rule 59 and/or Rule 60 Motion (collectively, the "Motion") made a 
sufficient showing under Utah law for consideration of relief. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that upon timely motion, a trial court may "in 
the furtherance of justice" relieve a party from a final order for any of the various reasons given in 
the Rule: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. 
Utah R Civ. P. 60(b). A trial court's disposition of a Rule 60(b) motion is a matter of 
judicial discretion, with the decision subject to an "abuse of discretion" standard of review. See, 
e.g., Golden Meadows Props, LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 258, ^ 3, 241 P.3d 371. 
Under Utah law, to succeed on his Motion under Rule 60(b)(1) or (2), Plaintiff was simply 
required to show the presence of one or more of the various reasons given in the Rule (i.e., 
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" or "newly discovered evidence") and to 
sufficiently plead a meritorious defense. "We have indicated that 'justice' is generally furthered 
by granting such a motion upon (1) a showing that there is a,n explicit basis for granting relief 
under one of the subsections of 60(b); and (2) an allegation of a meritorious defense." Jiidson v. 
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Wheeler RVLas Vegas, LLC, 2012 UT 6, If 14, {citing Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, If 64, 150 
P.3d 480; Erickson v. SchenkersInt'lForwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994). In this 
case, in contrast to the Trial Court's ruling, the plain language of Plaintiff s Motion sufficiently 
met the first element required of a Rule 60(b) motion. Plaintiff demonstrated the presence of 
mistakes, inadvertence, surprise, as well as newly discovered evidence, all of which were directly 
relevant to the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and its Findings and Conclusions and Order 
entered 4/21/11. (R: 96-103, R: 112-120, R: 121-124). Specifically, Plaintiff s Motion to Amend 
Judgment or Set Aside Judgment claimed relief pursuant to Rule 59, Rule 60(a), and Rule 60(b). 
(R. 146, 147-151.) Plaintiffs Statement of Facts set forth facts regarding alleged mistakes and 
Plaintiffs surprise regarding Defendants' submission of proposed findings to the Trial Court 
without following the notice requirements of Rule 7. (R 147-151.) 
The excusable neglect was based upon the fact that Defendants failed to follow Rule 7 and 
give the Plaintiff Notice that an Order was being entered. In fact the Trial Court refused to allow 
for the three days allowed by Rule 6 for the mailing of the Rule 59 Motion in that the rule states 
that the 10 days to file a Rule 59 Motion runs from the time the judgment is entered. That language 
is the exact reason that the Plaintiff sought to have the judgment vacated just in case the 10 days 
had expired; because the Defendants neglected to give Notice, the Plaintiff had no way of knowing 
the 10-day period had begun. The Plaintiffs Rule 60b Motion clearly stated that the Plaintiff had 
no issue with the language of the order in that it paralleled the Court's ruling. Instead, Plaintiff 
simply requested that it be set aside and re-entered to preserve the 10-day requirement of Rule 59. 
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Furthermore, the Court's November 4, 2011, ruling was in error when it found that the 
three days for mailing does not apply to this case because "the time period is not commenced by 
the mailing of a notice to Plaintiff. (R. 282-285, at 284; Memorandum Decision, Exhibit N.) 
The Court's ruling completely disregarded Rule 5(a)(1) which states in pertinent part as follows: 
"every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served . . . shall be served upon each of the 
parties." In this matter, the Defendants served notice of the entry of the order on April 26, 2011, 
five days after the order had been entered. (R. 128-142.) April 26 was a Wednesday, so 
allowing three days for mailing, the notice, which is a mailing required by the rules and subject to 
the three days mailing allowance by Rule 6, would not have been received until Monday, May 2, 
2012. The Plaintiff filed the Motion to Amend or Set Aside the following Monday, May 9, 
clearly within the 10 days anticipated by the Rule 59. The Court should have considered the 
Plaintiffs Rule 59 Motion, but if the Court determined that it was time barred for considering the 
Rule 59 Motion, it should have set the judgment aside and re-entered so that the Plaintiff could 
have sought relief pursuant to Rule 59 but failed because of Defendant's failure to comply with the 
notice requirements of Rule 7. 
In short, Plaintiffs Motion explicitly demonstrated alleged mistakes, surprise, 
inadvertence, excusable neglect and newly discovered evidence that required specific relief from 
the Trial Court, thus sufficiently identifying his grounds for relief and stating with particularity his 
relief sought under Rule 60(b). 
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Further, though it is true Plaintiffs Motion only briefly referenced Rule 60(b), this was 
done because the Motion also contained arguments regarding Rule 59 and Rule 60(a), which had 
been addressed first, so that Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) reference followed all of that discussion. This is 
not unlike a standard pleading format, where each new cause of action, instead of setting forth 
again all of the facts, simply incorporates them by reference in one paragraph, and then states the 
next cause of action pled. This is why Plaintiffs reference to Rule 60(b) simply says "Rule 60(b) 
allows for a judgment to be set aside for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect and/or 
newly discovered evidence based upon the reasons stated herein." 
In addition, when Plaintiff specifically cited "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable 
neglect, and/or newly discovered evidence," after having previously defined the issues for the 
court, he sufficiently identified the essential basis for his motion as required by Utah law. As stated 
by the Utah Supreme Court: "Form matters. We have consistently held, and more recently 
stressed, that moving parties must strive to direct the reviewing court to the specific relief they are 
seeking . . . . That is not to say that the law necessarily requires fastidious formality of citation 
form. A motion that fails to specify the applicable secondary or tertiary subsection of a rule or 
statute may still be appropriate if it identifies for the court the essential basis for the motion." 
Judson v. Wheeler RVLas Vegas, LLC, 2012 UT 6, 1J20 n. 9, 700 Utah Adv. Rep. 59. 
Finally, the Trial Court also refused to consider Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) motion for the 
ostensible reason that Plaintiff had failed to state "with particularity the relief sought pursuant to 
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Rule 60(b)." (R: 221-225, Memorandum Decision, 2; Exhibit M) Plaintiffs short and plain 
recitation in his closing paragraph of the relief he sought was as follows: 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order allowing 
the parties to submit additional evidence or oral argument regarding the issues addressed 
herein and to amend the Findings or issue new Findings consistant [sic] with the requests 
made herein. If the Court does not grant the Rule 59 Motion, the Plaintiff requests relief 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) for the reasons that are contained herein. 
(R: 147-151, at 150) 
The plain language of this closing paragraph, especially in light of Plaintiff s previous 
recitation of facts and his specific identification of the two questions at issue, particularly 
identified the remedy Plaintiff sought as required by Rule 7(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Further, such brevity is encouraged under Utah law, as Rule 7 itself requires that 
motions must "state succinctly" the relief sought and the grounds for the relief. Utah R Civ. P. 
7(b)(1). 
The Plaintiff desires to have his Rule 59 Motion heard so that the remaining issues may be 
addressed to resolve all the issues. The Rule 59 Motion recited specific language from the Trial 
Court's Memorandum Decision regarding the oral agreement found to exist between the parties 
and Plaintiffs duties under that Agreement, and noted the following specific questions that needed 
to be addressed: 
Since the Court's ruling, the undersigned received the attached letter from the Defendants' 
attorney. There appears to be two issues that have been left unanswered that needs to be 
addressed: 1) whether or not the Plaintiff s work that he provided in cleaning the property 
is the consideration allowing him to stay rent free on the property (another way to state the 
issue is whether or not the Plaintiff is obligated to do anything in the future to maintain the 
right to live on the property rent free); and 2) whether or not Utah Code Section 57-22-1 
[Utah Fit Premises Act] applies to their rental agreement. 
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(R: 14-151, at 149-150; Motion (Memorandum in Support, pp.3-4); Exhibit I ) . 
In conclusion, Plaintiffs Motion explicitly identified his grounds for relief in accordance 
with the requirements of Rule 60(b) under Utah law, and Plaintiff also clearly stated with 
particularity the relief he sought, i.e., the opportunity to submit additional evidence or oral 
argument to address two important questions that had not been addressed in the Trial Court's 
already issued Findings and Order. Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court not 
to at least consider Plaintiffs Motion for relief under Rule 60(b). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Plaintiff Elmer Bowen respectfully requests that 
this Court: 
(1) Remand the "Declaratory Judgment" issues to the Trial Court for final disposition by 
the Trial Court, clarifying at minimum (a) the scope and nature of the future work required of 
Plaintiff to maintain his right to live on the Property; and (b) whether the Utah Fit Premises Act 
applies to the parties' oral rental agreement; 
(2) Find that there is insufficient support for the Trial Court's legal conclusion that 
Defendants were not unjustly enriched by Plaintiffs "heavy equipment" work, and that based on 
the elements of unjust enrichment as correctly interpreted and applied to the Trial Court's 
findings and the evidence presented, it would be inequitable to allow the Defendants to benefit 
by Plaintiffs heavy equipment work without compensating him; 
(3) Find that the Trial Court's Findings are insufficient to support its Conclusion that 
Defendants are entitled to retain the 50% interest in the backhoe, as there was no agreement 
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between the parties as to the consideration and no contract under the Bill of Sale; and that as a 
result, per applicable "unjust enrichment" case law and the circumstances of this case, the backhoe 
should be returned to Plaintiff pursuant to his "unjust enrichment" claim; and 
(4) Find that the Trial Court abused its discretion when it refused to consider Plaintiff s 
60(b) Motion under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiff also respectfully requests an award of his attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
this appeal 
DATED this 25th day of May, 2012. 
James JC, Slavens 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
District Court Case No. 100700010 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20110447-CA 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT "A" 
EXHIBIT "B" 
EXHIBIT "C" 
EXHIBIT "D" 
EXHIBIT "E" 
EXHIBIT "F" 
EXHE8IT "G" 
EXHIBIT "H" 
EXHIBIT T 
EXHIBIT "J" 
EXHIBIT "K" 
EXHIBIT "L" 
EXHIBIT "M" 
EXHIBIT "N" 
Bill of Sale. 
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 16 (response) 
Plaintiff s Trial Exhibit 17 (letter) 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Trial Authority filed March 2, 2011. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, April 21, 2011. 
Order, April 21, 2011 
Plaintiffs Motion to Enter the Attached Order dated 4/22/2011. 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Enter the 
Attached Order dated 5/2/2011. 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment or Set Aside Judgment, with 
Memorandum in Support of Rule 59 and/or Rule 60 Motion, dated 5/9/2011 
Trial Court's Ruling dated 5/10/2011. 
Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal filed 5/17/2011 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend 
Judgment or Set Aside Judgment, dated 5/26/2011 
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated 7/27/2011 
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated 11/4/2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of May, 2012,1 caused to be mailed, first class postage 
prepaid, unless otherwise indicated below, a copy of the foregoing INITIAL BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
FILED 
[Original and 7 Copies] 
James W. Jensen 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
MAILED 
[2 Copies] 
JamesT^ Slavens, Esq 
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UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
BILL OF SALE 
TC-843 
Rev. 7/00 J 
Division of Motor Vehicles - 210 North 1950 West - Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 - Telephone (801) 297-7782 
• Automobile Q Light Truck, Van, or Util. Q Heavy Truck (over 12,000 lbs) Q Trailer 
j | Motorcycle 0 Off-Highway Vehicle Q Snowmobile Q Boat 
In consideration of V K A V J L C ^ ^ ^ ^ C.?T-K\ ^ \ r>c?> fe~.£Bn o sJ Dollars ($ | Q ^ - S U 
and other valuable consideration, paid to me by Mz> pjjQ <t~HK A ^ W ^ p i " ^ R o ^ e E C t ~ ^ - hfiPle f^ 
Buyer 
Seller 
buyer the following vehicle, as is: (2ArS€t 
Year 
do hereby sell and convey to the 
; g&Q C ; 
Make Model 
f Z.GOO 9 3~b 5 ^ 0 5 8 7 Z. and 
Vehicle Identification Number 
Mo A/f=> 
License Number 
I, warrant to the Buyer that the said vehicle is free and clear of any lawful claims and demands of all and every 
person, whatsoever. 
Used vehicles are sold as accepted and are not guaranteed. 
This form does not represent documentary evidence of ownership unless accompanied by the outstanding 
certtfteate-<rf title. 
Date 
% m m m 
MARY JANE HIGtEY 
I W o f Y ^ U b H c 
State of Utah 
My Comm. Expires May 12, 2007 
210 North 310 West Ste 100 Cedar City UT 84720 
wrmwn*^*r*m?mm~m m w m m 
FORM TC843 
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1/28/1010 15:31 h'AA » M 0 5 O 1 v , 
JAMES W.JENSEN (6578) 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Defendant 
250 South Mam 
PO BOX 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Telephone: (435) 586-4404 
FAX: (435) 586-1002 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KENNETH HART, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
Case No.: 100700010 
Judge: Donald J. Eyre 
Defendant, Kenneth Hart, answers Plaintiffs First Set of Discovery Requests as 
follows: 
v OBJECTION 
Defendant objects to the extent to which information or documents requested are 
privileged under attorney/client or attorney work product rules. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
Defendant answers Plaintiffs Request for Admissions as follows: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Please adroit that Plaintiff and Defendants 
formed an agreement wherein Plaintiff would provide products and services relating to the 
maintenance and improvement of the property which is the subject of this lawsuit. 
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ANSWER: Denied. There was no such writtemagreement. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Please admit that Plaintiff complied with his 
obligation to maintain and improve the subject property. 
ANSWER: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 3: Please admit that the Plaintiff, in fulfilling his 
obligations pursuant to the agreement between the parties, used his own equipment to maintain 
and improve the subject property, 
ANSWER: Denied, except Plaintiff did use his own equipment to clear some trash off 
the property. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Please admit that Defendants agreed to 
compensate the Plaintiff for the work provided. 
ANSWER: Denied, except Defendant agreed Plaintiff could live rent-free if the 
Plaintiff maintained the property. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Please admit that Defendants, to date, have not 
completely paid the Plaintiff for the work performed and services provided. 
ANSWER: Denied. There was no additional agreement to pay Plaintiff for what was 
the consideration for living on the property for free. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Please admit that Plaintiff and Defendants 
agreed that Plaintiff could remain on the subject property in exchange for certain 
consideration. 
ANSWER: Admitted, yes if hejn&juaifled and cleaned property. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Please admit that the Defendants5 land has 
been greatly improved by the items installed by the Plaintiff and by the services performed by 
the Plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Denied. There were no products installed. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Please admit that tire defendants* land has been 
greatly improved by the items installed by the Plaintiff and by the services performed by the 
Plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Denied. The valuehas not increased from Plaintiffs maintenance. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9: Please admit that the Defendant is in possession 
of the Plaintiff s backhoe. 
ANSWER: Denied. The backhoe was turned over to Plaintiftjon his request^to 
bonw_ba<y^^ -
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10: Please admit that, although there is a bill of 
sale, Defendant gave no value for Plaintiffs backhoe. 
ANSWER: Denied. Plaintiff lived rent-free on theproEgrtY^and Defend^ ajgg^gaye 
$10.00 as additional consideration. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Please admit that the Defendant was aware 
that the Plaintiff was claiming income from social security disability while living on the 
Defendant's property. 
ANSWER: Denied. Defendant had no personal knowledge of the same. 
INTERROGATORIES 
Defendant answers Plaintiffs Interrogatories as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: For those Request for Admissions of which you deny, 
please provide the following: 1) a detailed explanation of the reasons that you did not admit to 
the requests; and 2) upon which facts you rely to support your explanations as to your denial. 
ANSWER: See answers to Requests for Admissions, above. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 2: Please list and identify (as defined herein) any exhibits 
that you intend or expect co introduce into evidence at the trial of the above entitled matter and 
3 
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i£J U U 0 
state the name and address of the person presently having possession of said exhibits, 
ANSWER: Discovery is early. The Exhibits have not yet been identified, but 
Defendant has identified the following: 1) Bill of Sale; 2) Documents from State of Utah; 3) 
Letter from Charles Bickel; 4) Letter from Stacy Morrison and 5) Documents produced 
herewith. Additional Exhibits will be provided pursuant Co Court Order and deadlines. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify (as defined herein) each and every witness you 
plan to call to testify at the trial of this action and provide a brief summary of the facts to 
which each such witness will testify. 
ANSWER: Discovery is early and ongoing. It has not yet been determined who will 
be used as witnesses. To date, Defendant has identified the following witnesses: 1) Kenneth 
Hart - - Mr. Hart will testify to all matters related hereto, agreements and Bill of Sale; 
2) Clara Hart - - Mrs. Hart will testify to all matters related hereto; 3) Bobby Naftis - - Mr. 
Nafuswil][testify that Defendant paid diese.1, oiLjires. repairs for bacldaoe-and"1TilcEr 
4) Robert Kipler - - Mr. Kipler will testify to the painting, backhoe work performed, and free 
rent: and 5) Witnesses identified in Answer No. 2 related to said matters. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Have you engaged any experts for consultation or 
assistance who are expected to testify at the trial of this case? If sor please state the following 
for each expert: 
A. Identify each expert; 
B. State the subject matter upon which such expert is expected to testify; 
C. State the substance of the opinions to which such expert is expected to 
testify; and 
D. State the underlying facts and data upon which the expert opinion is 
based. 
ANSWER: Unknown at this point, 
4 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 5: To the extent not answered in response to the foregoing 
interrogatories, please identify (as defined herein) each and every person known to you who 
have any knowledge concerning the facts alleged in the Complaint and Answer or the alleged, 
damages or injuries sustained by Plaintiff as a result of said allegation. In so responding, 
please provide the following: A)Identify such person; B) State the subject matter upon which 
the person has knowledge; C) State the substance of such knowledge. 
ANSWER: See answers to Interrogatories No. 2 and No. 3 above, 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify each and every item and/or service provided, 
performed, or installed by the Plaintiff on Defendants' property, 
ANSWER: Tore down chicken, pens and put in trailer for removal. Covered debris 
Ttfffsite. Dug holes and ditch for trees. Hauling din and leveled ground. Planted trees and 
jgarden and put three gnomes on telephone poles. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: For each item and/or service listed above, please identify 
the price paid by Defendant to Plaintiff for Plaintiffs services. 
ANSWER: Free rent. No additional price paid for any services. Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 6, Plaintiff did on his own. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Indicate the total price (as estimated by the Defendant) for 
the cost of the items installed, and services performed, by Plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Approxijptdy^>^OQ^O. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: List each and every date on which Defendant informed 
the Plaintiff of any concerns, complaints, or dissatisfactions that Defendant had regarding the 
work performed by Plaintiff or the items installed on Defendant's property. 
a) For each date listed above, please indicate the nature of the 
conversation/complaint and provide the names of any and all persons 
with knowledge of the conversation. 
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b) Additionally, provide any documents, recordings, written statements, 
emails, etc., containing any complaint, concern or expression of 
dissatisfaction with Plaintiffs services, and/or the items installed on 
Defendant's property. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please indicate the amount, 10 date, that Defendant has 
paid the plaintiff for the services and work performed, and the items installed on Defendant's 
property. 
ANSWER: Approximaigh^l9,Q0Qiair maijceuent, 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please list each and every item to be installed, or service 
to be performed by Defendant, which Plaintiff did nayristal^^ 
a) For each and every item or service listed as a response, please indicate 
what agreement, document, or communication you rely upon in support 
of your position that Plaintiff agreed to, but did not, install item(s) or 
perform services, 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 12: Please identify each and every reason, defense, excuse, 
or basis on which you rely in support of your position that Defendant does not owe Plaintiff 
the remaining balance for the work/services performed by Plaintiff and the items installed on 
Defendants7 property by Plaintiff. 
ANSWER: Fair market rent value exceeds value of maintenance andjBckhoe-. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please indicate the terms of the agreement between the 
Plaintiff and Defendant with regard to the following: 
a) Requirements under which Plaintiff would live on Defendant*$ property; 
b) Amount of rent Plaintiff would pay the Defendant EO live on Defendant's 
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property; 
c) Conveyance of Plaintiffs backhoe to the Defendant; 
d) How much Plaintiff would be compensated for work performed by 
Plaintiff on Defendant's property; 
e) Cost of materials installed by Plaintiff on Defendants property. 
ANSWER: 
a) Maintain property and pay utilities; 
b) Exchanged for maintenance; 
c) Gift and used to offset rent/maintenancejiscre2an$y; 
d) Exchanged for rent; 
e) Defendant, paid materials. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please indicate the reason(s) for which Defendant placed 
exposed pieces of reinforcement bar ("rebar") around the side of the home on the subject 
property, 
ANSWER: Unknown what rebar is being referredjto.^ 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please identify, as defined in the above instructions, all 
services and material Plaintiff lias performed and/or installed on, in, or around the subject 
property. 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 6. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please identify all facts upon which you rely in support 
of your denials to Plaintiff's Complaint as set forth in Defendant's Answer previously filed in 
this matter, 
ANSWER: 
a) Paragraph 3 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. The 
Defendant does not know, with independent knowledge, the age of the Plaintiff. 
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b) Paragraph 6 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint, The 
Defendant does not know, with independent knowledge, of Plaintiff s reliance. 
c) Paragraph 7 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
Defendant agreesjhaUk£Jtei£^ Piaintiffdid the gardening and jpajiiting 
of his own volition 
d) Paragraph 8 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. There 
was never an agreement to compensate the Plaintiff for any costs or services. Rather, the only 
agreement was that Defendant would allow the Plaintiff to live^oiithe properijurentitee^s 
long^as he maintained thgjroperty. 
e) Paragraph 9 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. The 
Plaintiff did not provide equipment or services, nor did he incur any costs, to or in behalf of 
the Defendant. Plaintiff was not the Defendant's agent. 
f) Paragraph 10 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
There is absolutely no way a reasonable person would have spent 1.500 hours on the work 
which Plaintiff performed about the property, Defend^ 
$3?000.00 for the work which the Plaintiff performed on the property. 
g) Paragraph 11 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint, The 
Plaintif^^ 
h) Paragraph 12 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
There was, and is. no amount due and owing to the Plaintiff 
i) Paragraph 13 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
The Defendant never entered into an agreement with the Plaintiff wherein the Plaintiff agreed 
to sell to the Defendant his backhoe an&j^^ notthe agreement of the 
paries.. 
j) Paragraph 14 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
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There was no agreement for payment to the Plaintiff by Defendant on the backhoe. 
k) Paragraph 15 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. The 
"valuable consideration^ 
free". The dim£traler j^ 
1) Paragraph 16 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint. The 
Defendant has not failed to honor any "representations, commitments or promises" to the 
Plaintiff, for the reason that there were none, other than the Defendant's offer that the Plaintiff 
could live on the property rent free as long as he maintained the property. Further, the 
Plaintiff was not "induced" to sign any documentation, including the Bill of Sale. 
m) Paragraph 17 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. The 
commencement of this action by the Plaintiff was not "necessary.71 
n) Paragraph 19 of Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint. The 
Defendant did not enter into any agreement to pay "good and valuable consideration" to the 
Plaintiff for conveyance of the backhoe and dump trailer, Rather, the dump trailer belongs to 
the Plaintiffs son. The only "valuable consideration" offeredjDjj^^ 
o) Paragraph 20 of the Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
The "valuable consideration" provided by the Defendant was a place for the Plaintiff to live, 
rent free. The dump trailer belongs to the Plaintiffs son. 
p) Paragraph 21 of the Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
The dump trailer belongs to the Plaintiffs son, and was never a part of the parties'" discussions 
or dealings. The Bill of Sale on the backhoe speaks for itself. 
q) Paragraph 22 of the Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
The dump trailer belongs to the Plaintiffs son, and was never a part of the parties' discussions 
or dealings. The Bill of Sale on the backhoe speaks for itself. 
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r) Paragraph 23 of the Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The parties had entered into a verbal agreement wherein the Defendant agreed to allow the 
Plaintiff to live on the property rent free as long as he maintained the property. 
s) Paragraph 24 of the Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint, 
No judicial intervention is necessary or warranted. 
t) Paragraph 26 of the Defendant's Second Defense to die Plaintiff's Complaint. 
The "valuable consideration*' provided by the Defendant was a place for the Plaintiff to live, 
rent free. The dump trailer belongs to the Plaintiffs son. 
u) Paragraph 27 of the Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
There is absolutely no way a r eason^ on the work 
wliich Plaintiff performed about the property. Defendant had obtained a bid for a sum total of 
$3,000.00 for the work which the Plaintiff performed on the property. 
v) Paragraph 29 of the Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
There has been, and will be, no unjust enrichment by the Defendant. As stated above, the 
only agreement between the parties was a verbal one wherein the Defendant allowed the 
Plaintiff to live on the property, rent free, so long as he maintained the property. There was 
no other agreement between the parties. 
w) Paragraph 30 of the Defendant's Second Defense to the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
There is absolutely no way a reasonable person would have spent 1500 hours on the work 
which Plaintiff performed about the property. Defendant had obtained a bid for a sum total of 
53,000.00 for the work which the Plaintiff performed on the property. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17; Please identify all facts upon which you rely in asserting 
each Affirmative Defense, as set forth in Defendant's Answer previously filed in this matter. 
ANSWER: 
a) Mitigate: Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by incurring unnecessary costs 
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and fees. 
b) No Declaratory Relief: The parties * agreement that Plaintiff live on the 
property rent free as long as he maintains the property should stand, and the Bill of Sale 
should stand. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 18: Please identify and define exactly what "valuable 
consideration1' was paid by the Defendant as referenced in the attached bill of sale. 
ANSWER: No copy of bill of sale is attached. Plaintiff was free to live on property, 
plus work exchanges between parties. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
Defendant answers Plaintiffs Requests for Production as follows: 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Any and all written or otherwise recorded 
Statements taken by you or any person or anyone acting on your behalf (including insurance 
carriers) from any witness or person who purports to have knowledge of the facts or 
circumstances of the incident which is the subject of this litigation. 
ANSWER: Produced, to the extent that Defendant is aware of the same. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: All exhibits and documents (as defined 
herein) and commumcations (as defined herein) which you intend or expect to utilize at trial of 
this case. 
ANSWER: Produced, to the extent that Defendant is aware of the same. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please provide a copy of all documents and 
communications identified in your response or otherwise relied upon in responding to the 
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Admissions. 
ANSWER: Produced, to the extent that Defendant is aware of the same, 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please provide a copy of any and all 
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•&IUJL3 
correspondence, including but not limited to. emails and letters between the parties. 
ANSWER; Produced, to the extent that Defendant is aware of the same. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please provide any and all proof in 
Defendants' possession of any and all payments made by Defendant to Plaintiff, including but 
not limited to invoices, checks, bank statements, credit and/or debit card statements. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: A copy of any and all agreements between 
Plaintiff and Defendants. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: A copy of any and all change orders, or any 
document which altered or changed the original agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: A resume or curriculum vitae for all expert 
witnesses you expect to testify at trial or any other proceeding. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Please provide all trust documents for the 
Kennedi E. & Clara W^fis^ffait^Family Living Trust. 
ANSWEKfNot relevant 
DATED this 5 5 . day °f May, 2010. 
k^3X<bk^v 
KENNETH HART 
Defendant 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
On the 2Xs day of May, 2010, personally appeared before me KENNETH HART, 
Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, who being by me duly sworn, duly acknowledged to me 
that he has read the foregoing DEFENDANT'S ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET 
OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS, and that the same are true according to his knowledge, 
information and belief, and KENNETH HART acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
KASEYLMUSTO 
HcttmpwtxwimvwiH 
2» s. MAIN sram-
CEDAR CITY, UTAH W720 
comEXP.a-s-2011 
Notary Pubic 
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JAMES W. JENSEN (6578) 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Defendant 
250 South Main 
PO BOX 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Telephone: (435) 586-4404 
FAX: (435) 586-1002 
IN THE FOURTFI JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BO WEN, 
• v . 
KENNETH HART, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF 
MAILING OF DEFENDANT'S 
ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST 
SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
Case No.: 100700010 
Judge: Donald J. Eyre 
I hereby certify that I maiied a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DEFENDANTS ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY 
REQUESTS, to the following on this %& day of May, 2010. 
James K. Slavens 
JAMES K. SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES 
885 South Park Avenue Rear #2 
P. O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
JAJflES W. JENSEN'"' 
Attorney for Respondent 
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JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
P.O. Box 726 
250 South Main 
JAMES W. JENSEN, P.C Cedar City, Utah 84720 jim@soutIiernutahlaw.com 
TELEPHONE (435) 586-4404 www.southernittahlaw.com 
FAX (435) 586-1002 
May 4, 2009 
Via Facsimile: (435) 743-4245 
and Regular U.S. Mail 
James K. Slavens 
JAMES K. SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES 
885 South Park Avenue Rear #2 
P. O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Re: Elmer F. Bowen 
Dear Mr. Slavens: 
I am the attorney for, and represent, Kenneth Hart with regard to the above-referenced 
matter. Mr. Hart has asked me to respond in his behalf to your letter under date of April 10, 
2009. 
First, the referenced Bill of Sale was executed by Mr. Bowen on or about July 25, 
2006, more than 2 Vi years ago. As I am sure you are aware, you cannot simply revoke or 
rescind a Bill of Sale on a whim, nor without the consent and signature(s) of the party and/or 
parties involved, particularly in light of the time that has elapsed since the transaction 
occurred. 
Next, you state that Mr. Bowen has not received anything of value in exchange for the 
backhoe. As you are also evidently aware, Mr. Bowen has occupied Mr. Hart's house and 
property for approximately 4 years, never having paid rent to Mr. Hart during said period of 
time. The backhoe was signed over to Mr. Hart as a token payment for rent, as Mr. Bowen 
indicated he was without means to pay the same. Free housing more than qualifies as 
"valuable consideration." Mr. Hart will concede that Mr. Bowen did use the backhoe to work 
around the property. Mr. Bowen indicated to Mr. Hart that he felt the need to stay busy, and 
working around the yard was therapeutic for him. 
I am uncertain as to why Mr. Kibler was included on the Bill of Sale, other than the 
fact that he is Mr. Bowen's son. I am aware that at the same time the backhoe was transferred 
to Mr. Hart and Mr. Kibler, Mr. Bowen also transferred two (2) vehicles to his son. Mr. 
Kibler has advised Mr. Hart that he has no interest in the backhoe. 
Based on the above, Mr. Hart hereby requests that the backhoe be turned over to him 
forthwith, failure of which will result in pursuit of a claim against Mr. Bowen for all back rent 
due and owing Mr. Hart for the last 4 years, which I believe would far exceed the cost of the 
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James K. Slavens (6138) 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Phone: 435-743-4225 
Fax: 435-743-4245 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH HART, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
TRIAL AUTHORITY 
Case No. 100700010 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff, by and through the undersigned counsel, and 
supplements the authority presented at the trial as follows: 
1. Issue regarding mutuality of obligation: In this matter, there was a "bill of sale" which 
contained the language "In consideration of valuable consideration Dollars ($10.00) and other 
valuable consideration, paid to me by Kenneth Hart & Robert L. Kipler " (Italicized words 
represent was added by handwriting).1 The Defendant presented case law that allegedly stood 
1
 The Defendant argued that this language indicates a fully executed contract, in that the language provided that the 
consideration was already paid. However, the Plaintiff argued that the agreement was executory in nature in that the 
"valuable consideration" was stated twice and that the language indicated that the "valuable consideration would be 
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JAMES W. JENSEN (6578) 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Defendants 
250 South Main 
PO BOX 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Telephone: (435) 586-4404 
FAX: (435) 586-1002 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KENNETH HART, CLARA HART and 
KENNETH E. & CLARA WATTS HART 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No.: 100700010 
Judge: James Brady 
This matter having come duly before the Court for Trial on February 7, 2011, the 
Honorable James Brady presiding. The Plaintiff appeared in person, and by and through his 
counsel, James K. Slavens, JAMES K. SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES. The Defendants 
appeared in person, and by and through their counsel, James W. Jensen, JENSEN LAW 
OFFICE. The Court, after hearing testimony, reviewing the evidence admitted, and 
considering the arguments of counsel, hereby enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Kenneth E. Hart and Clara Watts Hart, through the Kenneth E. and Clara 
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Watts Hart Family Living Trust, are the current owners of the real property ("Property") 
located at 345 North 100 West, Kanosh, Utah, consisting of approximately 1.54 acres, with 
at least a shop building of approximately 2,000 square feet, and an adjacent studio apartment 
attached thereto. 
2. The parties agreed that there exists an oral agreement between the Plaintiff 
and Defendants that, since the Spring of 2006, the Plaintiff has been, and continues to be, 
entitled to live in the studio apartment on the Property, rent free, and his entitlement shall 
continue for the remainder of the Plaintiffs life, rent free. 
3. The only condition to the Plaintiffs right to live in the studio apartment on the 
Property is that he shall clean up, repair and maintain the Property. Those terms are not 
better defined. 
4. Plaintiff agreed to dismiss his cause of action against the Defendants for 
negligence. 
5. From 2006 until sometime in 2008, the Plaintiff provided labor to clean, repair 
and maintain the building and the premises, and to remove offending structures. Defendant 
Kenneth Hart, and family members of the Plaintiff and Defendants, also contributed labor to 
clean and improve the Property. 
6. There is no written agreement specifying the nature and extent of the work to 
be provided by the Plaintiff in exchange for the right to occupy the premises rent free for 
life. 
7. There was a verbal agreement to allow the Plaintiff to live rent free on the 
Property in exchange for cleaning, repairing and maintaining the Property, but the parties 
disagree as to the nature and amount of work those terms included. 
8. The Plaintiff understood the agreement allowed for the Plaintiff to live on the 
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Property, rent free, in exchange for his cleaning up and maintaining the Property, such as 
removing weeds, planting a garden, removing vermin and rodents, painting and general 
clean-up. The Plaintiff understood that any heavy equipment work he performed constituted 
separate and independent work, outside of the parties' verbal agreement for free rent, and for 
which Plaintiff is entitled to monetary compensation. 
9. Defendants understood the agreement called for the Plaintiff to perform all 
work on the Property, including the heavy equipment work as part of his cleaning up, 
repairing and maintaining services given in exchange for free rent for life, with no additional 
monetary compensation for any of the work performed. 
10. Each party supports their understanding of the terms of the agreement by the 
decisions made and actions taken by each party subsequent to the agreement. 
11. Evidence supporting Plaintiffs understanding of the agreement includes: 
a. In addition to the smaller equipment such as an ATV, small trailer and 
self-propelled lawn mower for routine cleaning and maintenance, after 
the agreement, the Plaintiff spent $21,680 for the heavy equipment he 
needed to do the heavy equipment work ($15,300 - back hoe; $5,200 -
dump trailer; $1,180- forks for the back hoe). 
b. Plaintiff worked for approximately 500 to 580 hours performing heavy 
equipment work during an approximate two-year period. 
c. The cost of the heavy equipment, and the value of the work, exceeds 
the benefit to the Plaintiff of living rent free in the studio apartment for 
the rest of his life. However, no evidence was presented regarding the 
Plaintiffs life expectancy (the Plaintiff is now 94 years old). Evidence 
of the value of the benefit of living in the studio apartment varied from 
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$200 per month to $700 per month, based on the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
Evidence supporting the Defendants' understanding of the agreement 
includes: 
a. The parties exchanged gifts and services between themselves as friends 
for many years without keeping a ledger, or demanding compensation. 
Defendants gave Plaintiff a wood stove and firewood for use in a 
former home, and the Defendants bought appliances (gas range and 
water heater) for their studio apartment so that the Plaintiff could live 
there during the winter of 2005-2006. The Defendants allowed the 
Plaintiff to live on the Property rent free during the winter of 2005-
2006, and Defendants provided paint, equipment and labor to help with 
the cleaning up, painting and removal of debris on the Property. The 
Defendants testified that the Plaintiff offered to do the heavy 
equipment work, and understood the work was a continuation of 
'friends helping friends', and part of the Plaintiffs promise to clean up 
and maintain the Property. 
b. Before there was an agreement for the Plaintiff to occupy the Property 
in exchange for cleaning up the Property, the Defendants obtained a 
bid to have a professional heavy equipment operator perform the labor 
of removing the old buildings and cement pads from the Property. The 
Defendants did not pursue hiring a third party once the Plaintiff offered 
to do the heavy equipment work as part of cleaning up the Property. 
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c. There was no evidence of any bid made by the Plaintiff, nor any 
agreement on a method of calculating compensation, nor any log of 
days or hours worked, nor any deadline for performance. 
d. The Plaintiff selected the dates and hours he worked with the heavy 
equipment, working a total of approximately 500 to 580 hours on the 
project over a period of approximately two (2) years. 
e. The Plaintiff never submitted a bill to the Defendants for his work until 
three (3) years later, when he made a demand through his attorney for 
compensation for "1500 hours of back hoe work" without an indication 
of the amount due. 
f. The Defendants provided an open account to supply the Plaintiff with 
fuel, oil and services, and Defendant Kenneth Hart made repairs to 
more than 50 flat tires on the back hoe while the Plaintiff was working 
on the Property. 
13. Plaintiff executed a Bill of Sale identifying Kenneth Hart and Robert L. Kipler 
as the new owners of the Case 580C back hoe. This Bill of Sale is without date. 
14. The Plaintiff executed transfers of title of many vehicles from himself to his 
son on or about the same day as he executed the Bill of Sale. 
15. The Plaintiff intended to divest himself of ownership of his vehicles on that 
day, giving all to his son except for a 50% interest in the back hoe, which 50% interest he 
transferred to Defendant Kenneth Hart. 
16. The Bill of Sale indicates, in part, "in consideration of valuable consideration 
Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable consideration, paid to me by Kenneth Hart and Robert 
L. Kipler, I, Elmer F. Bowen, do hereby sell and convey to the buyer the following vehicle." 
17. Defendant Kenneth Hart paid $10.00 to the Plaintiff while both were in the 
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bank where the Bill of Sale was notarized. 
18. There was no written promissory note and no written contract indicating that 
additional consideration needed to be paid in the future. 
19. The Plaintiff did not file a lien on the back hoe to protect an anticipated 
payment of any money from the Defendants. 
20. The Plaintiff delivered the Bill of Sale and the equipment to Defendant 
Kenneth Hart after the Bill of Sale was signed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Plaintiff is entitled 
to live in the studio apartment on the Property for the remainder of the Plaintiffs life, rent 
free, subject to the condition that he maintains the Property in good appearance and repair. 
2. The Plaintiffs work of cleaning up and maintaining the Property is 
consideration for receiving free rent for the rest of his life. 
3. There is no separate agreement between the parties regarding the heavy 
equipment work. 
4. There was no mutual understanding or meeting of the minds between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendants that the Plaintiffs heavy equipment work was based on a 
separate agreement. 
5. The heavy equipment work performed by the Plaintiff on the Property was 
work that the Plaintiff either did in exchange for living on the Property rent free for the rest 
of his life, or was work he did voluntarily, as a friend helping a friend. 
6. The Plaintiff waived his right to claim payment for unjust enrichment when he 
completed his work in 2008, and did not submit a bill, request for payment or statement of 
services to the Defendants. 
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7. Although the Plaintiff presented evidence regarding rates charged for back 
hoe services performed by others, there was no evidence of what a reasonable amount of 
compensation would be for the work performed by the Plaintiff. 
8. Although there was evidence of the estimated time spent by the Plaintiff, there 
was no evidence that it represented a "reasonable" amount of time to do the work. 
9. The Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the value by which his labors 
benefitted the Defendants. 
10. The Plaintiffs cause of action for recovery of money for heavy equipment 
work under both the contract and unjust enrichment theories should be dismissed. 
11. The Plaintiff transferred one-half (Vi) of his interest in the Case 580C back 
hoe to Defendant Kenneth Hart. 
12. Contracts for the sale of personal property involving compensation in excess 
of $500.00 must be in writing to be enforceable (See U.C.A. § 70A-2-201). 
13. The Plaintiffs Bill of Sale acknowledges that the transfer of title is predicated 
upon the Plaintiffs receipt of "other valuable consideration," which was paid to the Plaintiff. 
14. The Plaintiffs causes of action for judgment against the Defendants based on 
either an expectation of payment or upon unjust enrichment should be denied. 
15. The Plaintiffs cause of action for judgment against the Defendants based on 
negligence should be denied by reason of the stipulation of the parties. 
16. Except for the entry of a declaratory judgment, the remainder of the Plaintiffs 
Complaint should be dismissed. 
17. Each party should bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
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BY THE COURT: 
?.?'G/.V 
$li ;.;•* \t :<^L District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of April, 2011,1 caused to be mailed, via first 
class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a full, true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the following: 
James K. Slavens 
JAMES K. SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES 
885 South Park Avenue Rear #2 
P. O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Facsimile: (888) 456-6640 
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JAMES W. JENSEN (6578) 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Defendants 
250 South Main 
PO BOX 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Telephone: (435) 586-4404 
FAX: (435) 586-1002 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KENNETH HART, CLARA HART and 
KENNETH E. & CLARA WATTS HART 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No.: 100700010 
Judge: James Brady 
This matter having come duly before the Court for Trial on February 7, 2011, the 
Honorable James Brady presiding. The Plaintiff appeared in person, and by and through his 
counsel, James K. Slavens, JAMES K. SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES. The Defendants 
appeared in person, and by and through their counsel, James W. Jensen, JENSEN LAW 
OFFICE. The Court, after hearing testimony, reviewing the evidence admitted, and 
considering the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Declaratory Judgment is granted in favor of the Plaintiff, wherein the Plaintiff 
2811 APR 2! PH3--5I 
FILED B Y _ l J 2 ^ — 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
shall be entitled to live in the studio apartment on the property located at 345 North 100 
West, Kanosh, Utah (hereinafter "Property") for the remainder of the Plaintiffs life, rent 
free, subject to the condition that he maintains the Property in good appearance and repair. 
2. The Plaintiffs work of cleaning up and maintaining the Property is 
consideration for receiving free rent for the rest of his life. 
3. The heavy equipment work performed by the Plaintiff on the Property was 
work that the Plaintiff either did in exchange for living on the Property rent free for the rest 
of his life, or was work he did voluntarily, as a friend helping a friend. 
4. The Plaintiff has waived his right to claim payment for unjust enrichment. 
5. The Plaintiffs causes of action for recovery of money for heavy equipment 
work under both the contract and unjust enrichment theories are hereby denied and 
dismissed, with prejudice. 
6. The Plaintiffs causes of action for judgment against the Defendants based on 
either an expectation of payment or upon unjust enrichment are hereby denied and 
dismissed, with prejudice. 
7. The Plaintiffs cause of action for judgment against the Defendants based on 
negligence is hereby dismissed, with prejudice\ by reason of the stipulation of the parties. 
8. Except for the entry of the Declaratory Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, as 
set forth hereinabove, the remainder of the Plaintiffs Complaint, as amended, is hereby 
dismissed, with prejudice, and upon the merits. 
9. Each party shall bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
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DATED this ^)<4iyof QL^L\ ,2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
& ; JAMES BRADY 
' ^pi^dct Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of April, 2011,1 caused to be mailed, via first 
class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a full, true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
Order, to the following: 
James K. Slavens 
JAMES K. SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES 
885 South Park Avenue Rear #2 
P. O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Facsimile: (888) 456-6640 
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James K. Slavens (6138) 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Phone: 435-743-4225 
Fax: 435-743-4245 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH HART, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO ENTER THE 
ATTACHED ORDER 
Case No. 100700010 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff, by and through the undersigned counsel, and 
Motions this Court to enter the attached order for the following reasons. 
This matter came before the court for a trial on February 7, 2011. Plaintiff, Elmer 
Bowen, was represented by James K. Slavens, and Defendants, Kenneth Hart et aL, were 
represented by James Jensen. The matter was submitted to the court for its determination based 
on certain stipulations of the parties, the testimony of the parties and other witnesses, pleadings 
and other documentary evidence. Based on the above, the court issued a Memorandum Decision 
dated February 16,2011 and Ordered that the Defendants prepare "the appropriate findings of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fact and order based on this memorandum decision, for submission to opposing counsel and the 
court pursuant to Rule 7 U. R. Civ. P." The Defendants failed to comply with Rule 7 (f)(2) 
as ordered by the Court by failing to submit a proposed order within 15 days. 
The undersigned sent counsel on March 17, 2011 the letter attached hereto 
requesting that the Defendant comply with the Court's orders. Since the Defendant did 
not respond, the undersigned prepared the attached proposed order. After the following 
was prepared, the Plaintiff received the Defendant's belated proposed Findings and 
Order. Although the Plaintiff agrees that the Defendant's proposal parrots the Court's 
Memorandum Decision, the Plaintiff requests that the Court enter the following order for 
the reasons stated-or at least incorporates the language found herein in its final Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order in this case. 
DATED this 7 ( day of April, 2011. ^ 
J a ^ s K. havens 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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James K. Slavens 
Attorney-at-Law 
Licensed in Utah/Idaho 
885 South Park Ave. Rear #2 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Telephone: 435-743-4225 
Fax Number: 888-456-6640 
45 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 255 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 435-623-7300 
Fax Number. 888-456-6640 
March 17,2011 
Jensen Law Office 
James W. Jensen 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Re: Elmer Bowen v. Kenneth Hart 
Dear Mr. Jensen: 
As you know, it has been over 30 days since Judge Brady's decision in this matter and a 
few weeks since our letter to you regarding Elmer's response to the decision. I still think that we 
can resolve the issues as indicated in the letter; however, if your client is not interested in 
settling, please prepare your order as the decision ordered so that we can pursue our appeal. 
If you have any questions, please let me know. 
Sincerely, 
James K. Slavens, Esq. 
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James K. Stevens (6138) 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
435-743-4225 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BO WEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KENNETH HART et al. 
Defendant. : 
: JUDGMENT 
Case No. 100700010 
Judge Brady 
This matter came before the court for a trial on February 7, 2011. Plaintiff, Elmer 
Bowen, was represented by James K. Slavens, and Defendants, Kenneth Hart et al., were 
represented by James Jensen. The matter was submitted to the court for its determination 
based on certain stipulations of the parties, the testimony of the parties and other 
witnesses, pleadings and other documentary evidence. Based on the above, the court 
issued a Memorandum Decision dated February 16, 2011 and Ordered that the 
Defendants prepare "the appropriate findings of fact and order based on this 
memorandum decision, for submission to opposing counsel and the court pursuant to Rule 
7 U. R. Civ. P." 
The Defendants having failed to comply with Rule 7 (f)(2) as ordered by failing to 
submit a proposed order within 15 days; as a result, the Court hereby enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth and Clara Hart through Kenneth E. and Clara Watts Hart Family Living 
Trust are current owners of the real property located at 345 North 100 West, 
Kanosh, Utah. 
The parties, during the trial, acknowledged that the Plaintiff and the Defendants 
entered an oral contract sometime in the Spring of 2006 whereby Elmer Bowen 
was entitled to live in the studio apartment located on the property and entitled to 
remain on the property and live on the studio apartment for the rest of his life. 
The consideration for the agreement referenced in the previous paragraph was that 
he maintain the property in good appearance and repair. 
Based upon the agreement of the parties, Elmer Bowen is entitled to a declaratory 
judgment holding that Plaintiff is entitled to live in the studio apartment on the 
Property and use the Property for the remainder of his life subject to the condition 
that he maintain the property in good appearance and repair. 
Nothing in the Court's order is intended to effect the landlord/tenant obligations 
found in Utah Fit Premise Act found in Utah Code Section 57-22-1 et seq. 
All other findings of fact and conclusions of law found in the Memorandum 
Decision are hereby withdrawn without prejudice based upon the Defendants' 
failure to comply with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this day of April, 2011. 
Judge Brady 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Utah, resident of 
and with my office in Fillmore, UT; that I served a copy of the following described 
pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by 
facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on April ml£? 
2011. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Motion and Proposed Judgment 
ATTORNEY SERVED: (Mail) 
Jensen Law Office 
James W. Jensen 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
James K. Slavens 
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JAMES W. JENSEN (6578) 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Defendants 
250 South Main 
PO BOX 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Telephone: (435) 586-4404 
FAX: (435) 586-1002 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KENNETH HART, CLARA HART and 
KENNETH E. & CLARA WATTS HART 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
ENTER THE ATTACHED ORDER 
Case No.: 100700010 
Judge: James Brady 
Defendants, by and through their counsel, James W. Jensen, JENSEN LAW OFFICE, 
hereby submit their Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enter the Attached 
Order, as follows: 
FACTS 
1. A Trial was had in the above-referenced matter on February 7, 2011. 
2. On or about February 16, 2011, the Honorable James Brady issued his 
Memorandum Decision following the Trial. 
3. The Court's Memorandum Decision included Findings and Conclusions of Law. 
4. On or about April 21, 2011, the Court signed and entered on the record its 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
5. On or about April 21, 2011, the Court signed and entered on the records its 
Trial Order. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court made its decision and ruling following the Trial in this case on February 7, 
2011, as evidenced not only by its Memorandum Decision, but also as evidenced by its entry 
of the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order on April 21, 2011. The Plaintiff's 
Motion has been rendered moot by the entry of the Court's Findings, Conclusions and Order, 
and therefore lacks necessity for consideration or decision by the Court. 
DATED this l°\ day of April, 2011. 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
JAMES W.JENS:^ 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be mailed a full, true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enter the Attached Order 
to the following by first class mail postage prepaid on this S^ day of April, 2011: 
James K. Slavens 
JAMES K. SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES 
885 South Park Avenue Rear #2 
P. O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
^ 2 W 
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James K. Slavens (6138) 
P.O. Box 752 rvt 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 FlLED B Y ^ ~ 
Phone: 435-743-4225 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Plaintiff, OF RULE 59 AND/OR RULE 60 MOTION 
vs. 
Case No. 100700010 
Judge Donald J. Eyre 
KENNETH HART, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the above referenced Plaintiff, by and through the undersigned counsel, and 
submits his Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Pleadings or to Set Aside the Judgment 
pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 as follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This matter came before the court for a trial on February 7,2011. 
2. Plaintiff, Elmer Bowen, was represented by James K. Slavens, and Defendants, Kenneth 
Hart et al., were represented by James Jensen. 
3. The matter was submitted to the court for its determination based on certain stipulations of 
the parties, the testimony of the parties and other witnesses, pleadings and other 
documentary evidence. 
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Based on the above, the court issued a Memorandum Decision dated February 16, 2011 and 
Ordered that the Defendants prepare "the appropriate findings of fact and order based on 
this memorandum decision, for submission to opposing counsel and the court pursuant to 
Rule 7 U. R. Civ. P." 
The Defendants failed to comply with Rule 7 (f)(2) as ordered by the Court by failing to 
submit a proposed order within 15 days. 
The undersigned sent counsel on March 17, 2011 a letter requesting that the Defendant 
comply with the Court's orders. 
Defendants sent a Proposed Findings and Order which to the best of recollection did not 
have a certificate of service or any indication that the proposed order would be filed with the 
Court, but had a place for the undersigned to confirm as to form. 
The Defendant's Proposed Findings and Order did parrot the Court's Memorandum 
Decision but did not address the issues contained in the Plaintiffs Proposed Judgment filed 
onApril21,2011. 
The Plaintiffs Proposed Findings and Order sent to the Court had a cover letter dated April 
6, 2011, which cover letter to the best of our recollection had never previously been sent to 
the undersigned. 
The Defendants' Proposed Findings and Order sent to the Court and received April 21st 
were different than the Proposed Findings and Order sent to the undersigned in that a 
i 
• 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
certificate of service indicating an April 6th service date was added and which did not 
include the signature line requesting approved as to form. 
11. The Defendants failed to comply with Rule 7 by not preparing the Findings and Order 
within fifteen days of the Court's Memorandum Decision nor did they provide the five day 
notice plus three days for mailing envisioned by Rule 7. 
12. If fact, until the Defendants' Proposed Findings and Order were filed with the Court, and the 
undersigned noticed it on Court Exchange, the Plaintiff had no notice that the Proposals 
were going to be presented to the Court. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Rule 59 allows the Court to take additional testimony and either amend the Findings or enter 
new Findings based upon the evidence submitted. The Court allows such action based upon 
irregularity in the proceedings or accident or surprise. In this matter, the Court acknowledged that 
the "parties agreed that there exists an oral agreement between plaintiff and defendants that since 
spring of 2006, plaintiff has been, and continues to be, entitled to live in the studio apartment on the 
Property and his entitlement shall continue for the remainder of plaintiffs life, rent free." 
Memorandum Decision, paragraph 2. The Court also found that from "2006 until some time in 
2008, plaintiff provided labor to clean, repair and maintain the building and the premisses and to 
remove offending structures." Id. at para. 5. 
Since the Court's ruling, the undersigned received the attached letter from the Defendants' 
attorney. There appears to be two issues that have been left unanswered that needs to be addressed: 
1) whether or not the Plaintiffs work that he provided in cleaning the property is the consideration 
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allowing him to stay rent free on the property (another way to state the issue is whether or not the 
Plaintiff is obligated to do anything in the future to maintain the right to live on the property rent 
free); and 2) whether or not Utah Code Section 57-22-1 applies to their rental agreement. 
Rule 60 (a) allows for a judgment to be set aside based upon a clerical mistake. In this 
situation, it was a clerical mistake to enter the Findings and the Order until the time requirements of 
Rule 7 had been met. Simply sending the Proposed Findings without any indication that they will 
be sent to the Court does not comply with Rule 7. Furthermore, Rule 60 (b) allows for a judgment 
to be set aside for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect and/or newly discovered 
evidence based upon the reasons stated herein. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order allowing the 
parties to submit additional evidence or oral argument regarding the issues addressed herein and to 
amend the Findings or issue new Findings consistant with the requests made herein. If the Court 
does not grant the Rule 59 Motion, the Plaintiff requests relief pursuant to Rule 60 (b) for the 
reasons that are contained herein. 
DECLARATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 78B-5-705 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and accurate 
to the best of my understanding and recollection. 
DATED this \ day of May, 2010. 
James K. Slavens 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Utah, resident of and 
with my office in Fillmore, UT; that I served a copy of the following described pleading or 
document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by facsimile, with 
the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on May & 2010. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Motion 
PERSONS SERVED: 
James W. Jensen, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
PO Box 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Mail 
James K. Slavens 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - MILLARD 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, RULING 
vs. 
KENNETH HART, 
Defendant, 
Case No: 100700010 
Judge: JAMES BRADY 
Date: May 10, 2011 
P l a i n t i f f ' s mot ion t o entej?t^fe^%ched o r d e r i s den i ed 
C^* -•""-'• '•'-"':' ~"'~> / 'V 
Date: 5~-(D~l ( 
= >.-wrdge JAMES BRADY 
•^ ,...o -r 3 
By JbumpAccrtif 
STAMP USED AT DISCRETION OF JUDGE 
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James K. Slavens (6138) 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
435-743-4225 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KENNETH HART etal. 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
: Case No. 100700010 
Judge Brady 
This matter came before the court for a trial on February 7, 2011. Plaintiff, Elmer 
Bowen, was represented by James K. Slavens, and Defendants, Kenneth Hart et al., were 
represented by James Jensen. The matter was submitted to the court for its determination 
based on certain stipulations of the parties, the testimony of the parties and other 
witnesses, pleadings and other documentary evidence. Based on the above, the court 
issued a Memorandum Decision dated February 16, 2011 and Ordered that the 
Defendants prepare "the appropriate findings of fact and order based on this 
memorandum decision, for submission to opposing counsel and the court pursuant to Rule 
7U.R.Civ.R" 
The Defendants having failed to comply with Rule 7 (f)(2) as ordered by failing to 
submit a proposed order within 15 days; as a result, the Court hereby enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER: 
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Kenneth and Clara Hart through Kenneth E. and Clara Watts Hart Family Living 
Trust are current owners of the real property located at 345 North 100 West, 
Kanosh, Utah. 
The parties, during the trial, acknowledged that the Plaintiff and the Defendants 
entered an oral contract sometime in the Spring of 2006 whereby Elmer Bowen 
was entitled to live in the studio apartment located on the property and entitled to 
remain on the property and live on the studio apartment for the rest of his life. 
The consideration for the agreement referenced in the previous paragraph was that 
he maintain the property in good appearance and repair. 
Based upon the agreement of the parties, Elmer Bowen is entitled to a declaratory 
judgment holding that Plaintiff is entitled to live in the studio apartment on the 
Property and use the Property for the remainder of his life subject to the condition 
that he maintain the property in good appearance and repair. 
Nothing in the Court's order is intended to effect the landlord/tenant obligations 
found in Utah Fit Premise Act found in Utah Code Section 57-22-1 et seq. 
All other findings of fact and conclusions of law found in the Memorandum 
Decision are hereby withdrawn without prejudice based upon the Defendants' 
failure to comply with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this day of April, 2011. 
Judge Brady 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Utah, resident of 
and with my office in Fillmore, UT; that I served a copy of the following described 
pleading or document on the attorneys listed below by hand delivering, by mailing or by 
facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on Aprils/, 
2011. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Motion and Proposed Judgment 
ATTORNEY SERVED: (Mail) 
Jensen Law Office 
James W. Jensen 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
James K. Slavens 
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Case No: 100700010 Date: May 10, 2011 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 100700010 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: JAMES W JENSEN 250 S MAIN ST CEDAR CITY, UT 84720 
MAIL: JAMES K SLAVENS 885 S PARK AVE STE 102 FILLMORE UT 84631 
Date: £-10-1 [ uJAJLtruACCTtf. 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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James K. Slavens (6138) 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Phone: 435-743-4225 
Fax: 435-743-4245 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH HART, CLARA HART and 
KENNETH E. & CLARA WATTS HART 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 100700010 
Judge M. James Brady 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff, by and through the undersigned counsel, and 
files his: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL to the Judge's decision and this Court's Order and Findings of 
Fact entered April 21, 2011, in reference to the trial conducted before the Court on February 7, 
2011 and its subsequent Memorandum Decision of February 16, 2011 before the Honorable 
Judge James Brady of the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL to the Court's May 10, 2011 ruling denying the Plaintiffs 
proposed order filed April 22, 2011 and the Plaintiffs Rule 59 and 60 Motions filed May 9, in 
2MIHAYI7 PH2.-I9 
FILED BY 
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reference to the trial conducted before the Court on February 7, 2011 before the Honorable Judge 
James Brady of the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
DATED this H day of May, 2011. 
c // 
James l£ Slavens 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney and resident of the State of Utah, with 
offices in Nephi and Fillmore, Utah; that I caused to be served a copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the parties listed below by hand delivering, by mailing 
or by facsimile, with the correct postage thereon, a true and correct copy thereof on the 
P day of May, 2011. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
PERSONS SERVED: via U.S. Mail 
James W. Jensen 
250 South Main 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
^l 
James K, Stavens ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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JAMES W. JENSEN (6578) 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Defendants 
250 South Main 
PO BOX 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Telephone: (435) 586-4404 
FAX: (435) 586-1002 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, 
Vv: 
KENNETH HART, CLARA HART and 
KENNETH E. & CLARA WATTS HART 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
AMEND JUDGMENT OR SET 
ASIDE JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 100700010 
Judge: James Brady 
Defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby file their objection to 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment or Set Aside Judgment, as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
The Trial in the above-titled matter was held on or about February 7, 2011, the 
Honorable James Brady Presiding. On or about February 16, 2011, the Court entered its 
Memorandum Decision following the Trial. On or about April 6, 2011, Defendants submitted 
their transmittal letter, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order, to the above-
titled Court, and to counsel for Plaintiff, via first class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid. No 
ZOHO 27 FH S: 10 
FILL3 3 Y , AL 
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objection to the same was presented by the Plaintiff. On or about April 21, 2011, the Court 
entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order on its records. On or about 
April 21, 2011, Plaintiff submitted his Motion to Enter the Attached Order. On or about May 
3, 2011, Plaintiff submitted his first Notice of Appeal. On or about May 9, 2011, Plaintiff 
submitted his Motion to Amend Judgment or Set Aside Judgment; On or about May 10, 2011, 
the Court entered its Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion to Enter the Attached Order, Said Motion 
was denied* On or about May 17, 2011, Plaintiff submitted his second Notice of Appeal. It is 
unknown whether this Court has jurisdiction on the Motion to Set Aside, but files this 
Memorandum to protect Defendants' rights. 
DISPUTED FACTS 
1* Defendants dispute paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts, The 
Defendants did not fail to comply with Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
Plaintiff, prior to the Defendants' submission of the [proposed] Findings and Order, submitted 
a settlement proposal to the Defendants which the Defendants were taking into consideration, 
hence the delay in submission of the Findings and Order to the Court. A copy of the 
Plaintiff's settlement proposal, dated February 20, 2011, is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and 
by reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
2+ Defendants dispute paragraph 6 of the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts. The 
referenced letter of March 17, 2011, was not a request from the Plaintiff's counsel for the 
Defendants' to "comply with the Court's orders," but rather was an inquiry into the 
Defendants' position as to the Plaintiff's settlement proposal. A copy of the March 17, 2011 
letter is attached hereto as Exhibit B, and by reference incorporated herein and made a part 
hereof. 
& Defendants dispute paragraph 7 of the Plaintiff s Statement of Facts. The 
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Defendants' [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order did contain certificates of mailing, 
contrary to the Plaintiff's allegations. A certificate of mailing was made part of the [proposed] 
Findings, and was attached as "page 9 of 9." A certificate of mailing was also made part of 
the Defendants' [proposed] Order, and was attached as "page 4 of 4." Further, neither the 
[proposed] Findings nor the [proposed] Order contained a place for Plaintiff's counsel "to 
confirm as to form," for the reason that the documents mirrored the Court's Memorandum 
Decision; In addition, at the same time Defendants provided Plaintiff's counsel with a copy of 
each of the [proposed] Findings and the [proposed] Order, they also provided Plaintiff's 
counsel with a copy of the Defendants' letter to the Court Clerk under date of April 6, 2011, 
submitting said [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order to the Court for review, 
consideration and approval. The Defendants provided Plaintiff with ample notice and 
opportunity to object to the [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order. A copy of each of the 
[proposed] Findings and the [proposed] Order are attached hereto as Exhibits C and D, 
respectively, and by reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
4. Defendants dispute paragraph 8 of the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts. The Court 
entered its Memorandum Decision on or about February 16, 2011. The Defendants' 
[proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order mirrored the Court's Memorandum Decision, The 
Defendants' properly served a copy of the [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order upon the 
Plaintiff on or about April 6, 2011, as evidenced by the Certificates of Mailing attached to the 
respective documents. Plaintiff submitted his [proposed] Judgment on or about April 21, 
2011, long after the time for objection to the Defendants' [proposed] Findings and [proposed] 
Order had past. The Plaintiff, despite having ample notice and opportunity, did not object to 
the Defendants' [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order, nor did he timely Motion the 
Court to consider his [proposed] Judgment. 
5.,- Defendants dispute paragraph 9 of the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts. On or 
Page 3 of 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
about April 6, 2011, Defendants mailed to Plaintiff's counsel a copy of each of the [proposed] 
Findings and [proposed] Order, together with a copy of the transmittal letter to the Court of 
even date, pursuant to customary office practice. The Plaintiff was fully apprised of the 
Defendants* submission to the Court of their [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order, 
contrary to statements made by Plaintiff's counsel. Specifically, the statement made by 
Plaintiff's counsel concerning this issue, that is, " . . . which cover letter to the best of our 
recollection had never previously been sent to the undersigned" is clearly suspect, and is 
nothing more than another ruse and back-door attempt by Plaintiff's counsel to undermine this 
Court's decision following trial. 
6, Defendants dispute paragraph 10 of the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts. The 
Defendants forwarded to Plaintiff's counsel, via first class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a full 
true and correct copy of each of the [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order on or about 
April 6, 2011, as evidenced in the respective Certificates of Mailing. The [proposed] Findings 
and [proposed] Order submitted to the Court and to Plaintiff's counsel on or about April 6, 
2011, were and are the same. At no time was there a signature line for Plaintiff's counsel to 
approve the same as to form, as the [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order mirrored the 
Courts Memorandum Decision, and the Defendants gave ample notice and opportunity to the 
Pkijniffip:-c^ject to the [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order. See Exhibits A and B, 
respectively. 
7. Defendants dispute paragraph 11 of the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts. First, 
the Defendants did not fail to comply with Rule 7, as alleged by Plaintiff. As stated 
hereinabove, the Plaintiff, prior to the Defendants' submission of the [proposed] Findings and 
Order, submitted a settlement proposal to the Defendants which the Defendants were taking 
into consideration, hence the delay in submission of the Findings and Order to the Court. See 
Exhibit A, Next, Plaintiffs Counsel received more than ample notice of the submission of the 
Page 4 of 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
[proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order to the Court, and had more than ample time and 
opportunity to object to each of the Defendants' [proposed!] Findings and [proposed] Order. 
Defendants mailed a copy of the same to Plaintiff's counsel on or about April 6, 2011, as 
evidenced in the Certificates of Mailing. See Exhibits C and D, respectively. Plaintiff's 
counsel was also provided with a copy of the cover letter to the Court under date of April 6, 
2011, pursuant to customary office practice* 
S. Defendants dispute paragraph 12 of the Plaintiff's Statement of Facts. As stated 
hereinabove, the Plaintiff had more than ample notice than the [proposed] Findings and 
[proposed] Order had been presented to the Court for review and consideration. A copy of the 
cover letter to the Court under date of April 6, 2011 was forwarded to Plaintiff's counsel 
along with a copy of each of the [proposed] Findings and the [proposed] Order, pursuant to 
customary office practice. 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
i. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment is not timely. Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, provides, "(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or 
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the Judgment." The 
Judgment was entered by the Court on or about April 21, 201L The Plaintiff did not Motion 
the Court to amend the judgment until on or about May 9, 2011, long past the time allowed 
for said Motion. 
2* Plaintiff alleges that Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "allows the Court 
to take additional testimony and either amend the Findings or enter new Findings based upon 
the evidence submitted." The Plaintiff further alleges that, "[t]he Court allows such action 
based upon irregularity in the proceedings or accident or surprise." 
3. Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that, "on a motion for a new 
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trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of Jaw or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment." [Emphasis added]. 
4, Plaintiff has not filed a Motion for a New Trial and the time for filing the same 
has long past, 
5, Plaintiff's reliance on Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for his Motion to 
Amend is without basis, 
6, Plaintiff has failed to meet the elements for setting aside a judgment under Rule 
60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
7, In its Memorandum Decision, at paragraphs 31, 32, and 33, the Court 
confirmed Defendants' ownership of the Plaintiff's one-half (Vfc) interest in and to the Case 580 
backhoe. A copy of page 6 of the Court's Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit 
E, and by reference incorporated herein and made a part hereof. 
8* Plaintiff and his friend, Alan Peacock, have retained the Case 580 backhoe, 
refusing to release the same to the Defendants without payment from the Defendants for 
"storage" of the same. A copy of each of Alan Peacock's letters under date of February 11, 
2011, April 8, 2011 and May 1, 2011, are attached hereto as Exhibit F, and by reference 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof, 
% Defendants are entitled to return of the Case 580 backhoe from the Plaintiff, at 
no cost to them for any alleged "storage" of the same. 
10. Defendants' copy of the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Rule 59 and/or 
Rule 60 Motion is incomplete, in that it does not contain a copy of the "letter from the 
Defendants'attorney" which was allegedly received by Plaintiff's counsel following the 
Court's ruling. 
11, There are no issues left unanswered or that need to be addressed by the Court. 
P a p 6 of 11 
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12. The Court, in its Memorandum Decision, at paragraphs 21 and 22, page 5, 
addressed the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff is obligated to do anything in the future to 
maintain the right to live on the Defendants' property rent free for the rest of his life. 
Specifically, paragraph 21
 r page 5, provides that, " . . . plaintiff is entitled to live in the studio 
apartment on the Property for the remainder of the plaintiff's life, rent free subject to the 
condition that he maintains the property in good appearance and repair." Further, paragraph 
22, page 5, provides, "[plaintiff's work of cleaning up and maintaining the Property is 
consideration for receiving free rent for the rest of his life." 
13* The Court, in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on or about 
April 16, 2011, at paragraphs 1 and 2, page 6, also addressed the issue of whether or not the 
Plaintiff is obligated to do anything in the future to maintain the right to live on the 
Defendants* property rent free for the rest of his life. 
14. The Court, in its Order entered on or about April 16, 2011, at paragraphs 1 and 
2, pages 1 and 2 respectively, further addressed the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff is 
obligated to do anything in the future to maintain the righit to live on the Defendants' property 
rent free for the rest of his life. 
15, The issue of whether or not Utah Code Section 57-22-1 applies to the parties' 
rental agreement is not an issue for address by the Court, The Plaintiff did not previously 
plead the same. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment or Motion to Set Aside Judgment does not meet 
the elements under Rule 59 and/or Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
First, the Motion to Amend Judgment is not timely. Rule 59 provides, "(e) Motion to 
alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later 
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than 10 days after entry of the Judgment." The Judgment was entered by the Court on or 
about April 21, 2011. The Plaintiff did not Motion the Court to amend the judgment until on 
or about May 9, 2011, long past the time allowed for said Motion. 
Next, Plaintiff relies on Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as a basis for 
submitting additional evidence and/or additional testimony for consideration by the Court. 
Rule 59 does provide that, "on a motion for anew trial in an action tried without a jury, the 
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the 
entry of a new judgment." [Emphasis added]. However, the Plaintiff has not filed a Motion 
for a new trial, but rather has filed a Motion to Amend Judgment or Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment, The time for filing a Motion for a new trial has long past. The Plaintiff is not 
entitled to present additional evidence nor additional testimony to the Court. 
Next, the Plaintiff relies on Rule 60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as a basis for his 
Moticwn to Set Aside Judgment. However, the Plaintiff's Motion fails to meet all of the 
elements of relief from judgment or order as set forth in said Rule 60, In order for a party to 
be relieved from an order or judgment, "he must not only show that the judgment was entered 
against him through excusable neglect (or any other reason specified in Rule 60(b)), but he 
must also show that his motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and that he has a 
meritorious defense to the action. State of Utah By and Through Utah State Dept? of Social 
Services v, Musselman. 667 R2d 1053, 10554056 (Utah 1983). The Court in Musselman 
also held: 
This Court's statement in the Cox decision (quoted immediately above) clearly 
sets forth the policy in this jurisdiction requiring that the lower court consider 
and resolve the question of excusable neglect (when the motion to vacate the 
judgment is based on excusable neglect) prior to its consideration on the issue of 
whether a meritorious defense exists. Furthermore, in accordance with this 
policy, it is unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate, to even consider the issue 
of meritorious defense unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has 
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beenshown. 
Id. This decision appears to require all of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) claims to 
be considered and resolved before addressing the issue of whether there is a meritorious claim. 
The Plaintiff has met only the element of timeliness. The Plaintiff attempts to persuade the 
Court that the Findings and Order were entered by and through clerical error. The Plaintiff's 
counsel alleges that he did not receive notice that the Defendants' [proposed] Findings and 
[proposed] Order were going to be, or had been, presented to the Court for consideration. 
This statement lacks truth. As stated ad nauseum throughout, the Defendants, on or about 
April 6, 2011, sent a copy of each of the [proposed] Findings and the [proposed] Order to 
Plaintiffs counsel, via first class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid. See Exhibits A and B, 
respectivelyv A copy of the transmittal letter to the Court Clerk under date of April 6, 2011, 
submitting the [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order for review and consideration by the 
Court, was also forwarded to the Plaintiff's counsel on or about April 6, 2011. Next, 
Plaintiff's counsel alleges that the [proposed] Findings and the [proposed] Order did not 
contain certificates of mailing. This statement also lacks truth. A certificate of mailing was 
made part of the [proposed] Findings, and was attached and referenced as "page 9 of 9." A 
certificate of mailing was also made part of the Defendants' [proposed] Order, and was 
attached and referenced as "page 4 of 4." See Exhibits C and D, respectively. Next, the 
Plaintiff's counsel alleges that the [proposed] Findings and [proposed] Order contained a place 
for the Plaintiff's counsel to confirm (or approve) the same as to form, and further alleges that 
the Findings and Order entered by the Court on or about: April 21, 2011, did not contain said 
verbiage. Once again, Plaintiff's counsel fails at honesty. At no time was there a signature 
line for Plaintiff's counsel to approve the [proposed] Findings and/or the [proposed] Order by 
reason that the same mirrored the Court's Memorandum Decision, and further for the reason 
that Defendants gave ample notice and opportunity to the Plaintiff to object to the [proposed] 
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Findings and the [proposed] Order. See Exhibits C and D, respectively. 
The Plaintiffs Motion is discombobulated and meandering, with no defined argument 
in support thereof. Plaintiff's Motion fails to meet the elements set forth in Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rules 59 and 60 with respect to amending a Judgment and/or setting aside a 
Judgment, and, as such, his Motion to Amend Judgment or Set Aside Judgment should be 
denied. 
DATED this lb day of May, 2011., 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
M E S W , JENpN "^ 
Jmomey for Defendants 
Page 10 of 11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be mailed a full, true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment or Set 
Aside Judgment to the following by first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid on this ^4? day 
of May, 2011: 
James K. Slavens 
JAMES K. SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES 
885 South Park Avenue Rear #2 
P. O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Secretary 7 
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James K. Slavens 
Attorney-at-Law 
Licensed in Utah/Idaho 
885 South Park Ave. Rear #2 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84431 
Telephone: 435-743-4225 
Fax Number: 888-456-6640 
45 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 255 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 435-623-7300 
Fax Number: 888-456-6640 
February 20, 2011 
Jensen Law Office 
James W. Jensen 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Re: Elmer Bowen v. Kenneth Hart 
Dear Mr, Jensen: 
We have received Judge Brady's decision, and I have reviewed the same with Elmer. As 
I am sure you would suspect, we disagree with the Court's decision and are considering our 
appeal options. However, Elmer has encouraged me to inquire to see if there is room for 
compromise short of appeal 
First, as you know, Utah law requires a rental residence to be habitable. There are several 
areas of the residence need immediate attention to satisfy Utah law: a heater needs to be installed 
in the kitchen; the motor in the heater in the bedroom has burned out and needs to be replaced; 
insulation needs to be installed in the ceiling and on the outside walls-Elmer's heating bill is 
unacceptable; there are some electrical issues that are causing problems with the appliances in 
the residence and may be the reason that the motor in the heater in the bedroom has burned out; 
and carpet needs to be laid throughout the residence. 
Second, Elmer is most upset with the judge's ruling regarding the backhoe. He 
understood the risks, although we feel that we put on sufficient evidence to support the claim, 
associated with attempting to gain reimbursement for the services that he provided to the 
property, However, he mostly wants the ownership of the backhoe returned to him and his son. 
Please consider the following as a means to formally finalize the dispute between the parties. 
Robert does own half of the backhoe and has not been compensated for your client's use of the 
backhoe to improve his own property, Robert has authorized me to seek reimbursement for 
Kenny Hart's use of his half of the backhoe in improving Kenny's property. Would Kenny 
consider returning to Robert his share of the backhoe in exchange for Elmer waiving his appeal 
rights and Robert waiving any claim that might have for Kenny's use of the backhoe to improve 
his property. I do believe that Robert would consider a separate deal with Kenny, outside 
Elmer's approval, to return half of the backhoe to Kenny after Elmer no longer would have any 
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use for the backhoe. I think mat we could successfully work the agreement to protect Kenny. 
Please let me know what your client's position is regarding the suggestions found in this 
letter* If you have any questions, please let me know. 
Sincerely, 
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James K, Slavens 
Attomey-at-Law 
'* Licensed in Utah/Idaho 
885 South Park Ave. Rear #2 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Telephone: 435-743-4225 
Fax Number: 888-456-6640 
45 North Main Street 
P.O.Sox 255 
Nephf, Utah 84648 
Telephone: 435-623-7300 
Fax Number 888-456-6640 
March .17,2011 
Jensen Law Office 
James W. Jensen 
RO. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Re; Elmer Bowen v, Kenneth Hart 
Dear Mr* Jensen: 
As you know, it has been over 30 days since Judge Brady's decision in this matter and a 
few weeks since our letter to you regarding Elmer's response to the decision. I still think that we 
can resolve the issues as indicated in the letter; however, if your client is not interested in 
settling, please prepare your order as the decision ordered so that we can pursue our appeal. 
If you have any questions, please let me know. 
Sincerely, 
,•••'•"7 
James K. Slavens, Esq. 
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JAMES W. JENSEN (6578) 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Defendants 
250 South Main 
PO BOX 726 
Cedar City, UT 84721 
Telephone: (435) 586-4404 
FAX: (435) 586-1002 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BOWEN, 
Plaintiff, 
KENNETH HART, CLARA HART and 
KENNETH E. & CLARA WATTS HART 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No.: 100700010 
Judge: James Brady 
This matter having come duly before the Court for Trial on February 7, 2011, the 
Honorable James Brady presiding. The Plaintiff appeared in person, and by and through his 
counsel, James K. Slavens, JAMES K. SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES. The Defendants 
appeared in person, and by and through their counsel, James W. Jensen, JENSEN LAW 
Ol^IGE, The Court, after hearing testimony, reviewing the evidence admitted, and 
considering the arguments of counsel, hereby enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Kenneth E, Hart and Clara Watts Hart, through the Kenneth E. and Clara 
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Watts Hart Family Living Trust, are the current owners of the real property ("Property") 
located at 345 North 100 West, Kanosh, Utah, consisting of approximately 1,54 acres, with 
at least a shop building of approximately 2,000 square feet, and an adjacent studio apartment 
attached thereto, 
2. The parties agreed that there exists an oral agreement between the Plaintiff 
and Defendants that, since the Spring of 2006, the Plaintiff has been, and continues to be, 
entitled to live in the studio apartment on the Property, rent free, and his entitlement shall 
continue for the remainder of the Plaintiffs life, rent free. 
3. The only condition to the Plaintiffs right to live in the studio apartment on the 
Property is that he shall clean up, repair and maintain the Property. Those terms are not 
better defined. 
4. Plaintiff agreed to dismiss his cause of action against the Defendants for 
negligence, 
•|k From 2006 until sometime in 2008, the Plaintiff provided labor to clean, repair 
and maintain the building and the premises, and to remove offending structures. Defendant 
Kenneth Hart, and family members of the Plaintiff and Defendants, also contributed labor to 
clean and improve the Property. 
6, There is no written agreement specifying the nature and extent of the work to 
be provided by the Plaintiff in exchange for the right to occupy the premises rent free for 
life. 
7, There was a verbal agreement to allow the Plaintiff to live rent free on the 
Property in exchange for cleaning, repairing and maintaining the Property, but the parties 
disagree as to the nature and amount of work those terms included. 
;8>. The Plaintiff understood the agreement allowed for the Plamtiff to live on the 
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Property, rent free, in exchange for his cleaning up and maintaining the Property, such as 
removing weeds, planting a garden, removing vermin and rodents, painting and general 
clean-up. The Plaintiff understood that any heavy equipment work he performed constituted 
separate and independent work, outside of the parties5 verbal agreement for free rent, and for 
which Plaintiff is entitled to monetary compensation. 
9. Defendants understood the agreement called for the Plaintiff to perform all 
work on the Property, including the heavy equipment work as part of his cleaning up, 
repairing and maintaining services given in exchange for free rent for life, with no additional 
monetary compensation for any of the work performed. 
10. Each party supports their understanding of the terms of the agreement by the 
decisions made and actions taken by each party subsequent to the agreement 
IL Evidence supporting Plaintiffs understanding of the agreement includes: 
a. In addition to the smaller equipment such as an ATV, small trailer and 
self-propelled lawn mower for routine cleaning and maintenance, after 
the agreement, the Plaintiff spent $21,680 for the heavy equipment he 
needed to do the heavy equipment work ($15,300 - back hoe; $5,200 -
dump trailer; $1,180 - forks for the back hoe). 
% Plaintiff worked for approximately 500 to 580 hours performing heavy 
equipment work during an approximate two-year period. 
c> The cost of the heavy equipment, and the value of the work, exceeds 
the benefit to the Plaintiff of living rent free in the studio apartment for 
the rest of his life.- However, no evidence was presented regarding the 
Plaintiffs life expectancy (the Plaintiff is now 94 years old). Evidence 
of the value of the benefit of living in the studio apartment varied from 
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$200 per month to S70G per month, based on the credibility of the 
witnesses, 
12. Evidence supporting the Defendants' understanding of the agreement 
includes: 
a. The parties exchanged gifts and services between themselves as friends 
for many years without keeping a ledger, or demanding compensation. 
Defendants gave Plaintiff a wood stove and firewood for use in a 
former home, and the Defendants bought appliances (gas range and 
water heater) for their studio apartment so that the Plaintiff could live 
there during the winter of 2005-2006, The Defendants allowed the 
Plaintiff to live on the Property rent free during the winter of 2005-
2006, and Defendants provided paint, equipment and labor to help with 
the cleaning up, painting and removal of debris on the Property. The 
Defendants testified that the Plaintiff offered to do the heavy 
equipment work, and understood the work was a continuation of 
* friends helping friends', and part of the Plaintiffs promise to clean up 
and maintain the Property. 
b, Before there was an agreement for the Plaintiff to occupy the Property 
in exchange for cleaning up the Property, the Defendants obtained a 
bid to have a professional heavy equipment operator perform the labor 
of removing the old buildings and cement pads from the Property. The 
Defendants did not pursue hiring a third party once the Plaintiff offered 
to do the heavy equipment work as part of cleaning up the Property. 
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c. There was no evidence of any bid made by the Plaintiff, nor any 
agreement on a method of calculating compensation, nor any log of 
days or hours worked, nor any deadline for performance. 
d. The Plaintiff selected the dates and hours he worked with the heavy 
equipment, working a total of approximately 500 to 580 hours on the 
project over a period of approximately two (2) years. 
.e* The Plaintiff never submitted a bill to the Defendants for his work until 
three (3) years later, when he made a demand through his attorney for 
compensation for " 1500 hours of back hoe work" without an indication 
of the amount due, 
£ The Defendants provided an open account to supply the Plaintiff with 
fuel, oil and services, and Defendant Kenneth Hart made repairs to 
more than 50 flat tires on the back hoe while the Plaintiff was working 
on the Property. 
13v Plaintiff executed a Bill of Sale identifying Kenneth Hart and Robert L. Kipler 
as the new owners of the Case 580C back hoe. This Bill of Sale is without date. 
14, The Plaintiff executed transfers of title of many vehicles from himself to his 
son on or about the same day as he executed the Bill of Sale. 
15. The Plaintiff intended to divest himself of ownership of his vehicles on that 
day, giving all to his son except for a 50% interest in the back hoe, which 50% interest he 
transferred to Defendant Kenneth Hart. 
16v The Bill of Sale indicates, in part, "in consideration of valuable consideration 
Dollars ($10.00) and other valuable consideration, paid to me by Kenneth Hart and Robert 
L, Kipler, I, Elmer F. Bowen, do hereby sell and convey to the buyer the following vehicle." 
17, Defendant Kenneth Hart paid S10.00 to the Plaintiff while both were in the 
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bank where the Bill of Sale was notarized. 
18. There was no written promissory note and no written contract indicating that 
additional consideration needed to be paid in the future. 
19. The Plaintiff did not file a lien on the back hoe to protect an anticipated 
payment of any money from the Defendants. 
20. The Plaintiff delivered the Bill of Sale and the equipment to Defendant 
Kenneth Hart after the Bill of Sale was signed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Plaintiff is entitled 
to live in the studio apartment on the Property for the remainder of the Plaintiffs life, rent 
free, subject to the condition that he maintains the Property in good appearance and repair. 
2. The Plaintiffs work of cleaning up and maintaining Hie Property is 
consideration for receiving free rent for the rest of his life, 
3. There is no separate agreement between the parties regarding the heavy 
equipment work. 
4. There was no mutual understanding or meeting of the minds between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendants that the Plaintiffs heavy equipment work was based on a 
separate agreement. 
5. The heavy equipment work performed by the Plaintiff on the Property was 
work that the Plaintiff either did in exchange for living on the Property rent free for the rest 
of his life, or was work he did voluntarily, as a friend helping a friend. 
6; The Plaintiff waived his right to claim payment for unjust enrichment when he 
completed his work in 2008, and did not submit a bill, request for payment or statement of 
services to the Defendants. 
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7. Although the Plaintiff presented evidence regarding rates charged for back 
hoe services perfdrnied by others, there was no evidence of what a reasonable amount of 
compensation would be for the work performed by the Plaintiff 
8. Although there was evidence of the estimated time spent by the Plaintiff, there 
was no evidence that it represented a "reasonable" amount of time to do the work, 
9. The Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the value by which his labors 
benefitted the Defendants. 
10. The Plaintiffs cause of action for recovery of money for heavy equipment 
work under both the contract and unjust enrichment theories should be dismissed. 
11. The Plaintiff transferred one-half (l/2) of his interest in the Case 580C back 
hoe to Defendant Kenneth Hart. 
12* Contracts for the sale of personal property involving compensation in excess 
of $50000 must be in writing to be enforceable (See U.C.A. § 70A-2-201). 
13. The Plaintiffs Bill of Sale acknowledges that the transfer of title is predicated 
upon the Plaintiff s receipt of "other valuable consideration," which was paid to the Plaintiff 
14. The Plaintiffs causes of action for judgment against the Defendants based on 
either an expectation of payment or upon unjust enrichment should be denied. 
15. The Plaintiff s cause of action for judgment against the Defendants based on 
negligence should be denied by reason of the stipulation of the parties. 
16. Except for the entry of a declaratory judgment, the remainder of the Plaintiffs 
Complaint should be dismissed. 
17. Each party should bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
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DATED this day of , 2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
JAMES BRADY 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of April, 2011,1 caused to be mailed, via first 
class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a full, true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the following: 
James K. Slavens 
JAMES K, SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES 
885 South Park Avenue Rear #2 
P.O. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Facsimile: (888) 456-6640 
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JAMES W. JENSEN (6578) 
JENSEN LAW OFFICE 
Attorney for Defendants 
250 South Main 
PO BOX 726 
Cedar City,UT 84721 
telephone: (435) 586-4404 
FAX: (435) 586-1002 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELMER BO WEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KENNETH HART, CLARA HART and 
KENNETH E. & CLARA WATTS HART 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No.: 100700010 
Judge: James Brady 
This matter having come duly before the Court for Trial on February 7, 2011, the 
Honorable James Brady presiding. The Plaintiff appeared in person, and by and through his 
counsel, James K. Slavens, JAMES IC SLA YENS & ASSOCIATES, The Defendants 
appeared in person, and by and through their counsel, James W. Jensen, JENSEN LAW 
OFFICE. The Court, after hearing testimony, reviewing the evidence admitted, and 
considering the arguments of counsel, and being flilly advised in the premises, and good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
L Declaratory Judgment is granted in favor of the Plaintiff, wherein the Plaintiff 
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shall be entitled to live in the studio apartment on the property located at 345 North 100 
West, Kanosh, Utah (hereinafter "Property") for the remainder of the Plaintiffs life, rent 
free, subject to the condition that he maintains the Property in good appearance and repair, 
2, The Plaintiffs work of cleaning up and maintaining the Property is 
consideration for receiving free rent for the rest of his life. 
3, The heavy equipment work performed by the Plaintiff on the Property was 
work that the Plaintiff either did in exchange for living on the Property rent free for the rest 
of his life, or was work he did voluntarily, as a friend helping a friend. 
4, The Plaintiff has waived his right to claim payment for unjust enrichment, 
5v The Plaintiffs causes of action for recovery of money for heavy equipment 
work under both the contract and unjust enrichment theories are hereby denied and 
dismissed, with prejudice. 
6, The Plaintiffs causes of action for judgment against the Defendants based on 
either an expectation of payment or upon unjust enrichment are hereby denied and 
dismissed, with prejudice, 
7. The Plaintiff's cause of action for judgment against the Defendants based on 
negligence is hereby dismissed, with prejudice, by reason of the stipulation of the parties. 
& Except for the entry of the Declaratory Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff; as 
set forth hereinabove, the remainder of the Plaintiffs Complaint, as amended, is hereby 
dismissed, with prejudice, and upon the merits, 
9> Each party shall bear their own costs and attorney's fees. 
Page 2 of 4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BATED this _ day of ,2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
JAMES BRADY 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of April, 2011,1 caused to be mailed, via first 
class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, a full, true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
Order, to the following: 
James K. Slavens 
JAMES K. SLAVENS & ASSOCIATES 
885 South Park Avenue Rear #2 
P. 0. Box 752 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Facsimile: (888) 456-6640 
. jtttiih-IM-
Secretary 
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23. There is no separate agreement between the parties regarding the heavy equipment work-
24. There was no mutual understanding or meeting of the minds between plaintiff and 
defendants that plaintiffs heavy equipment work was based on a separate agreement. 
25. Heavy equipment work performed by the plaintiff on the Property was work plaintiff 
either did in exchange for living on the Property rent free for the rest of his life, or was 
work he did voluntarily, as a friend helping a fiiend, 
26. Plaintiff waived his right to claim payment for unjust enrichment, when he completed his 
work in 2008, and did not submit a bill, request for payment, or statement of services to 
Plaintiff: 
27. Although plaintiff presented evidence regarding rates charged for back hoe services 
performed by others, there was no evidence of what a reasonable amount of compensation 
would be for the work performed by plaintiff. 
28. Although there was evidence of the estimated time spent by plaintiff, there was no 
evidence that it represented a Reasonable" amount of time to do the work. 
29. Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the value by which his labors benefitted defendants. 
30. Plaintiffs cause of action for recovery of money for heavy equipment work under both 
the contract and unjust enrichment theories should be dismissed. 
3 L Plaintiff transferred one half of his interest in the Case 580 back hoe to defendant. 
32, Contracts for the sale of personal property involving compensation in excess of $500.00 
must be in writing to be enforceable (See §70A-2-201). 
33. Plaintiff s Bill of Sale acknowledges the transfer of title is predicated up plaintiff s 
receipt of "other valuable consideration" which was paid to plaintiff. 
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DOG VALLEY RANCH 
HC 74 BOX 6025 
GOVE .FT. UTAH 84713 
<4-T5)4|S-0265 
02/19/2011 
Dear Mr. Bowen: 
Per your request I have attached a copy of the storage agreement as it applies to the described 
vehicles. I have listed both of the vehicles we discussed - however 1 have only listed the storage 
fees for the Case backhoe per your request. 
The fees were established on a 30 day month average at $17.00 per day. 
As of February 19, 2011 the number of days the vehicles have been stored is 859 days at a daily 
rate of $17.00 per vehicle. 
Case backhoe: 859 days @$17.00 ($14603.00) 
Dump trailer: 859 days @$ 17.00 ($14603.00) 
The fees will continue at a daily rate of $17.00 until the vehicles are picked up or other 
arrangements are made. 
Also per your instructions - any person wishing to pick up one or both of the vehicles must show 
clear owner ship of the vehicle. I am sure the court document you have described will meet that 
standard. 
** anyone wishing to pick up the vehicles should make arrangements with me via phone prior to 
arriving at the location, Due to the time of the season the backhoe will have to be driven off the 
property to a less muddy/wet location prior to being loaded onto any type of transport. The dump 
trailer can be towed behind a pickup and can be picked up at the location. Please remember the 
agreement - payment for storage must be made in cash or with a cashiers check. 
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Alan Peacock April 8* 2011 
HC 74 box 6025 
Cove Fort Ut 84713 
Law Office of James W Jensen 
Attention: James W. Jensen 
Re: Your Demand Letter dated April 6, 2011 
(Your clients - Kenneth and Clair Hart) 
Dear Mr, Jensen: 
In response to you letter demanding I return the case backhoe. 1 believe to make such a demand of 
nie is frivolous, I don't own the backhoe, I only allowed the backhoe to be stored on my property 
for more than two and one-half years at the daily rate of $17.00. It would seem reasonable to 
believe that if your clients owned the backhoe they chose to leave the backhoe on my property. 
They have my telephone number and both have called me during the past two and one-half years. 
During the spring of 2009 Mr. Hart called asking questions about the backhoe. I directed him to 
Mr. Kibfor or Mr, Bowen, I don't know the substance of those conversations. 
Your letter suggests that someone absconded with their backhoe, that the backhoe has been hidden 
- and suggests that I had something to do with such events or activity. Your threat of some sort of 
"prosecution for your behaviors" is troubling to me and I strongly urge you to contact the local 
authorities and make a criminal complaint - if you believe a crime has been committed* As for your 
other threat or caution "both you and Mr. Bowen will be jointly responsible for any damage to the 
backhoe." Any caution or message that you have for Mr. Bowen should be directed to Mr, Bowen -
I believe he does have an attorney. I am not your messenger and I will not relay your threats 
or cautions to anyone* 
In addition to my previous demand for storage fees - you should let your clients know that the fees 
continue to grow each day at the daily rate of $17.00.1 would also like to make your clients 
aware that effective April 15th, 2011 the daily rate will increase to $150.00. The backhoe has 
been stored on my property and I don't really care who shows up with the cash to bail it out - your 
clients, Mr. Bowen or Mr, Kibler. I am not an agent for the Harts, Bowen or Kibler -1 am just the 
person who stored the backhoe and now I want payment for the storage. The first person here with 
the cash or cashiers check for the storage fees can have the backhoe. If you or your clients have a 
problem with that or with whom made the arrangements to store the backhoe you and your clients 
should take it up with them. Again I am only the person who's property the backhoe has been 
stored on for the past two and one-half years. 
It appears - based on your 'demand letter5 that your clients have no plan to pay the storage fees. At 
this point it seems that my best bet is to file a foreclosure on the backhoe for non payment of the 
fees in order to recover my fees. 
ce: Kenny and Clair Hart 
Robert Kibler 
Elmer Bowen 
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Alan Peacock 
HC 74 box 6025 
Cove Fort Utah 84713 
(435)418-0265 
Law Office of James W Jensen 
Attention: James W. Jensen Attorney 
Re your clients Ken and Clair Hart 
Case Backhoe - storage fees 
Dear Mr, Jensen: 
I have not heard from your clients re the backhoe - nor have they made any attempt to pay their 
one-half of the storage fees. It appears that they have abandoned the Backhoe. 
As of May 1,2011 one half the amount owed in fees was $8622.00. The fees continue to grow 
and it is In their best interest to pay the fees and take the backhoe. 
The alternative to the continued non-payment of the fees will result in an attempt to sell their 
interest in the backhoe through auction in order to recover the owed fees. 
Based on your letter dated April 6,2011 and the perceived threats contained in that letter, in 
addition to the harsh words uttered by your client Kenneth Hart - and directed at me during his 
recent visit to his property located in Kanosh Ut I would like for the Harts to make some 
arraignment for payment of the fees, and arrange for the removal of the Backhoe from my 
property as soon as possible. 
Prior 859 days @ $17.00 per day $14603.00 
February 20,2011 -April 14 2011 @$17.00 per day (23 days) 391.00 
April 15 - April 30 @$150.00 per day 2250,00 
TOTAL DUE:(asofAprif302ou) $17244,00 
Thank you for your attention to this matter 
Sincerely *-—*•~"c' 
Alan Peacock 
cc: Kenneth and Clair Hart 
Elmer Bowen 
Robert Kibler 
May 1,2011 
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FILED BY Jbk 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, MILLARD COUNTY 
ELMER BOWEN, 
vs. 
KENNETH HART, etal., 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 100700010 
Judge James Brady 
This matter came before the court for review. On February 7,2011, this case came on for 
bench trial. After receiving evidence, proffer by counsel, exhibits, and argument by counsel, the 
court took the matter under advisement. The court issued its Memorandum Decision on the 16th 
of February, 201L The court signed the findings of fact and order on the 21st of April, 2011. 
Plaintiff filed a motion to amend judgment or set aside judgment and memorandum in support 
thereof on May 9,201L On May 27,2011 the court received Defendant's memorandum in 
opposition to this motion. On June 10,2011 Plaintiff filed a Reply memorandum. On June 22, 
2011, Plaintiff filed a readiness to submit. Plaintiffs motion is pending and ripe for decision. 
After filing this motion, and before any action was taken thereon by the court, on May 17,2011 
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in this case. 
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ANALYSIS 
L JURISDICTION. 
As a general rule, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is under 
advisement on appeal.1 However, the White court also acknowledged that there is an exception 
allowing the trial court jurisdiction to consider a rule 60 motion after an appeal has been filed.2 
This court is not aware of any similar exception for a rule 59 motion. To the extent Plaintiffs 
motion is presented as a rule 59 motion the court can not consider or rule on it for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
IL PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IS TREATED AS A RULE 60 MOTION. 
Rule 7 requires all motions to "state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and 
the grounds for the relief sought" In the present motion, Plaintiff has not identified any of the 
grounds for relief enumerated in rule 60(b). Plaintiff has not stated with particularity the relief 
sought pursuant to rule 60(b). Therefore, the court can not consider this motion for relief 
pursuant to rule 60(b). 
Plaintiff did present argument that rule 60(a) allows the court to set aside the order based 
on clerical mistake. This is not an accurate reading of the rule. 
1
 White v. State, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990) 
2Id (See also, National Advertising Company v. Murray* City, 131 P.3d 872 (UT App 
2006) 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at 
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, 
as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is 
pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b ) . . . 
Nothing in rule 60(a) allows the order to be set aside. It only provides that a clerical error 
may be corrected. 
Plaintiffs memorandum alleges that it was a clerical mistake for the court to enter the 
Findings and Order before the time requirements of rule 7 had been met. If true, this would not 
be a clerical error. 
Rule 60(a) applies only to cure errors "in accurately memorializing a judgment." 
In re C.S.B. 2000 UT App 362, f 9,17 P.3d 1131. Clerical error "is a type of mistake or 
omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record and which does not 
involve a legal decision or judgment." Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 
1201,1206 (Utah 1983). A clerical error is one of recording "that results in the entry of a 
judgment which does not conform to the actual intention of the court." Thomas A. 
Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125,130 (Utah 1989). In contrast, a judicial 
error "is one made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect 
judgment." Id.3 
It is incorrect to refer to the court's decision to execute findings and an order which 
conforms to the actual intention of the court, as a clerical error. As is explained below, no rule 7 
error was made. 
3
 Jolley v Jolley, 2004 WL 2569423 (Utah App. 2004) 
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Defendants complied with the requirements of rule 7 in presenting their proposed 
findings and order to the court for execution. Defendants sent plaintiff a copy of the proposed 
findings and order parroting the court's memorandum decision on April 6,2011. Pursuant to 
rule 7, Plaintiff had five days within which to file any objection (not counting intermediate 
weekends and adding three days because the proposed findings and order were served by mail). 
Plaintiffs last day to file objections was April 18th. The court received no objection to the 
findings and order from Plaintiff. Defendants' findings and order were signed by the court on 
April 21,2011. 
Plaintiff also claims Defendants violated rule 7 by not preparing the findings and order 
within fifteen days, and by not providing a five day notice plus three days for mailing envisioned 
by Rule 7. Neither of these allegations, involve clerical functions. However, if there were clerical 
error, the only relief allowed by this rule is the correction of the error. Plaintiff acknowledges that 
the findings and order are consistent with the actual intention of the court and Plaintiff has not 
identified a specific clerical error, therefore there is nothing to correct. Plaintiff alleged no 
prejudice. Plaintiffs motion is denied. 
DATED this 21st day of July, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 100700010 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: JAMES W JENSEN 250 S MAIN ST CEDAR CITY, UT 84720 
MAIL: JAMES K SLAVENS 885 S PARK AVE STE 102 FILLMORE UT 84631 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, MILLARD COUNTY 
ELMER BOWEN, 
vs. 
KENNETH HART, etal., 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 100700010 
Judge Brady 
This matter came before the court on Plaintiffs rule 60 motion to reconsider its previous 
ruling on Plaintiff rule 59 motion. The court previously heard the trial in this matter, signed the 
findings of fact and order on the 21st of April, 2011. Plaintiff filed a motion to amend judgment 
or set aside judgment and memorandum in support thereof on May 9, 2011 which the court 
treated as a rule 59 and/or a rule 60 motion. On May 17, 2011 Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in 
this case. On July 21,2011 this court ruled on Plaintiffs motion to amend judgment or set aside 
judgment. The court denied the motion to amend judgment treating it as a Rule 59 motion, and 
believing it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion due to the intervening filing of an appeal. 
The court denied the motion to set aside judgment, treating it as a Rule 60 motion. 
On August 29,2011, Plaintiff filed a Rule 60 motion "to reconsider" the courts ruling of 
July 21, 2011, alleging the court erred in its understanding that it lacked jurisdiction due to the 
intervening filing of an appeal. Defendant filed its memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs 
August 29th motion, and Plaintiff replied. Plaintiffs August 29th motion is now ripe for decision. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
As a preliminary matter, the court needs to address the availability of a "Motion to 
Reconsider." It is clear that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a motion to 
reconsider. Many courts have specifically ruled that there is no provision for "reconsideration" in 
Rule 60. In its decision in, Ron Shepards Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994) the court 
stated, "[T]his court has consistently held that our rules of civil procedure do not provide for a 
motion for reconsideration of a trial court's order or judgment...."See also, Gillette v Price, 135 
P.3d 861 (Utah 208). As a general rule, this court does not recognize any right of the parties to 
request that the court "reconsider" its decision. This court has, and will continue to reject 
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motions to reconsider. 
However, pursuant to Rule 54(b), when the court needs to correct its own errors the court 
may revisit and revise its interlocutory decisions, before a final judgment is entered. In this case, 
a final decision was made when the court signed and entered its judgment on April 21, 2011. 
However, this present motion is made to address an alleged error by the court on a post judgment 
Rule 59 motion. On that motion, the court determined it lacked jurisdiction. For the limited 
purpose of correcting an error, this court will make an exception to its general rule regarding 
motions to reconsider. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Jurisdiction. J 
Upon review of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, specifically Rule 4(b), the court 
agrees with Plaintiff and Defendant, that the trial court does not lose jurisdiction over a timely 
filed rule 59 motion when a notice of appeal is filed after the rule 59 motion is made, and before 
a decision is rendered on that motion.. 
II. Timeliness. 
Rule 59(e), URCivP states: 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall 
be served not later than 10 days after entry of the Judgment. 
There is no dispute that the date of entry of judgment is April 21, 2011 and that the date 
of filing of Plaintiff s motion was May 9, 2011. 
As it applies to rule 59 motions, rule 6(a) requires that time computation begin the day 
after the event from which the designated time began to run. In this case the designated event was 
the entry of the judgment on April 21, 2011. Therefore the first day of the 10 day period was 
April 22, 2011. 
Rule 6(a) also requires that when the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
Therefore, April 23 and 24, and April 30 and May 1st are the intermediate Saturdays and Sundays 
and are excluded in the computation. The were no intermediate legal holidays during the period 
in question. 
Since the first day in the computation of time is April 21, 2011 and after excluding the 
intermediate Saturdays and Sundays, the tenth day ends on May 5, 2011. Pursuant to rule 6, the 
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last day of the period shall be included in the time period. Therefore, a rule 59 motion must have 
been filed not later that May 5,2011 to be timely. 
Plaintiffs efforts to include an additional three days for mailing misapplies the rules. 
Rule 6(e) states: 
(e) Additional time after service by mail Whenever a party has the right or is required to 
do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a 
notice or other paper upon him and the notice of paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days 
shall be added to the end of the prescribed period . . . 
The time period for the filing a rule 59 motion is not "after the service of a notice or other paper 
upon him," the time period is after a specific event, namely, "the entry of the judgment."Since 
the time period is not commenced by the mailing of a notice to Plaintiff, Plaintiff is not entitled 
to the additional three days for mailing. 
Plaintiffs May 9th, 2001 rule 59 motion was not timely filed. Although previously denied 
on belief that the court lacked jurisdiction denial of the motion is justified on an alternate finding. 
Plaintiffs motion was not timely filed and the court received no motion to extend time. 
ORDER 
Plaintiffs May 9, 2011 rule 59 motion is denied due to the untimely filing of the motion. 
DATED this 3rd day of November, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 100700010 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: JAMES W JENSEN 250 S MAIN ST CEDAR CITY, UT 84720 
MAIL: JAMES K SLAVENS 885 S PARK AVE STE 102 FILLMORE UT 84631 
Date: wfljtn; nJ Jog ryoh.c^SfoK/n^r^i^ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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